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Separating Constitutional and CommonLaw Torts: A Critique and a Proposed
Constitutional Theory of Duty
William Burnham*
Since the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape,: the Supreme
Court has struggled to separate constitutional and common-law
torts.2 Before Monroe, courts assumed that the two types of
tort were mutually exclusive: if a defendant's conduct violated
state law, the conduct could not be "under color of" state law,
which is a prerequisite to an action under section 1983 of title
42 of the United States Code.3 Monroe determined that action
in violation of state law came within the sweep of section 1983,
which necessarily meant that official conduct could constitute
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I would like to
thank Martin Kriegel and Clark Cunningham for many useful comments on

earlier drafts.
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe, the Court considered an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against Chicago police officers who had illegally
searched, detained, and harassed the plaintiff and his family. The defendants
argued that because their conduct, if proven, violated state law, the plaintiff's
only remedy was under state law in state court. The Monroe Court held, however, that a state official's action can be both a violation of state law and an
action "under color of" state law that violates federal rights. Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 184-87. When that is the case, "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked." Id. at 183.
2. The term constitutionaltort describes any action for damages for violation of constitutional rights, either against federal defendants, usually under
the implied right-of-action theory of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971), or against state and local
defendants, usually under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The phrase is attributed to Professor Shapo. See Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 323-24 (1965).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 205-59 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Though the Court had long ago discarded this theory as a test
of state action for constitutionalpurposes, see Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288-89 (1913), courts continued to read pre-Home
Telephone concepts into § 1983 on the theory that the 1871 Congress intended
the earlier concepts when it used the term "under color of" state law in
§ 1983, see P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND
RELATED STATUTES 12-15 (1988).
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both a state common-law and a federal constitutional tort. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain how one might tell the
difference between the two.
The need to distinguish between constitutional and common-law torts has become more important in recent years as
the Court has embarked on a campaign to ensure that commonlaw torts do not "sneak" into federal court disguised as constitutional claims. 4 In the process, however, the Court has failed
to formulate a coherent theory of precisely how the two differ
from each other.
The Court's most recent solution to the problem is reflected in Daniels v. Williams5 and Davidson v. Cannon.6 In
Daniels and Davidson, the Court imposed a culpable state of
mind requirement for all violations of the due process clause,
which accounts for most constitutional tort actions. According
to the Court, conduct
of government officials that amounts to
"mere negligence ' 7 does not violate the due process clause, because a "deprivation" of life, liberty, or property means something more than a "mere lack of due care by a state official."
4. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-36 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
5. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
6. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
7. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334.

8.

Id. at 330-31. The rule was applied in Daniels and Davidson to dismiss.

§ 1983 damages actions brought by prisoners against their custodians: Daniels

sued for injuries sustained when he tripped over a pillow that a guard had left
on a jail stairway; Davidson sued for injuries sustained when prison officials
failed to protect him from a threatened attack by a fellow inmate.
If it was true before Daniels that "[n]o problem so perplexes the federal
courts today as determining the outer bounds of" constitutional torts, Jackson
v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting?),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), that statement is no less true after Daniels.
In Daniels's aftermath, the lower federal courts continue to struggle no less
earnestly to make sense of those boundaries and to incorporate the Court's latest effort to redefine them. A sampling of recent cases in the courts of appeals
includes Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1988) (No. 87-1422); Marsh v. Barry, 824 F.2d 1139,
1145 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 998 (1989);
Ketchum v. County of Almeda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987); Myers v.
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1468-69 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 97 (1987);
Lunde v. Oldi, 808 F.2d 219, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d
552, 558 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987); Franklin v. Aycock,
795 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094,
1104-05 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Patton v. Sourbeer, 107 S. Ct. 3276
(1987); Love v. King, 784 F.2d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 1986); Cannon v. Taylor, 782
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Under Daniels, then, a government actor who intentionally
causes harm commits a constitutional tort, but a government
actor who negligently causes harm commits, at most, a common-law tort.
This Article takes the position that the Daniels state of
mind solution is flawed and proposes a different theory for separating common-law and constitutional torts. Part I of the Article outlines the history of the United States Supreme Court's
efforts to place limits on constitutional tort actions and to distinguish those actions from common-law torts. Part II analyzes
and criticizes the Daniels solution to the problem. Part III explores the reasons for the Court's difficulties in Daniels. Part
IV proposes a theory of duty as a means of separating constitutional and common-law torts and deals with potential objections to the theory. The Article argues that the Court should
analyze the due process clause and determine the nature and
extent of the duties it imposes as distinct from duties that the
common law imposes. Only through a duty theory can the
Court coherently distinguish those losses of life, liberty, or
property that are subject to due process constraints from those
losses that state tort law should remedy.
I.

THE WINDING ROAD TO DANIELS V. WILLIAMS

Due process rights long have constituted a high percentage
of constitutional tort cases. One reason for this is that the due
process clause covers a large area. There are presently four
kinds of due process: incorporated due process, 9 "fundamental
F.2d 947, 949-50 (11th Cir. 1986). See generally M. SCHVARTZ & J. KIRKLIN,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES § 3.5 (1986) (discussing
Supreme Court due process negligence cases); S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §§ 3.09-.10 (2d ed.

1986) (discussing Parrattand Daniels and their treatment in courts of appeals).
In addition, Daniels has created a new dimension of uncertainty as some
lower federal courts debate whether to apply the Daniels state of mind test to
other constitutional rights. See Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Bd., 788
F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Danielsand holding that election irregularities implicate § 1983 only if there is willful misconduct); Willocks v.
Dodenhoff, 110 F.R.D. 652, 657 (D.Conn. 1986) (citing Daniels and finding no
fourth amendment violation "when a police officer is alleged to have negligently included material false statements in an affidavit accompanying a warrant application"), aff'd mem., 305 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986). But see Uberoi v.
University of Colo., 713 P.2d 894, 902-03 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (holding that
Daniels's no-negligence rule applies to due process claims but not to first,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendment claims).
9. Incorporated due process includes the Bill of Rights minus the grand
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rights" substantive due process, 10 "shock the conscience" substantive due process,:1 and procedural due process. 12 The other
jury and civil jury trial rights. Incorporated due process thus covers rights
that the courts consider substantive, such as first amendment rights, see, e.g.,
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (free speech), as well as rights that the
courts consider procedural, such as the criminal due process rights contained
in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (right to jury trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 6 (1964) (self-incrimination). The current standard for deciding whether the
Constitution incorporates a right is set forth in Duncan: a right is of constitutional dimension if it is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49. See generally J. NowAX, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.6 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing incorporation of Bill of
Rights).
10. "Fundamental rights" substantive due process includes primarily the
right to privacy. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (marridge); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-06 (1977) (family);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973) (abortion); see also J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 9, §§ 11.7, 14.26-.30 (discussing right to privacy).
Also included are the right to receive a certain minimum level of treatment,
services, and safety when incarcerated by the government. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 314-25 (1982).
11. "Shock the conscience" substantive due process comprises outrageous
behavior of officials not otherwise violative of any more specific constitutional
provision. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), is the genesis of this
branch. Rochin was a criminal case in which the Court held that pumping the
suspect's stomach to get evidence, although not violative of any specific provision of the Constitution, was so outrageous as to "shock the conscience" and
therefore violated due process. Id. at 172. Near complete incorporation of Bill
of Rights protections largely has dispensed with the necessity of relying on
such an open-ended due process doctrine in criminal procedure cases, but the
"shock the conscience" standard lives on as a basis for civil liability. See, e.g.,
Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1261 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding liability under
§ 1983 for damage caused by police brutality), overruled in part, Justice v.
Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (1987); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (finding liability under § 1983 for damage caused by shocking
police conduct); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.) (finding liability under § 1983 for prison guard brutality that shocked the conscience),
cert. denied sub nom., Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973);
see generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 8, § 3.08 (discussing due process before
Parratt);M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8, § 3.3 (discussing § 1983 excessive force cases).
12. Procedural due process requires that the government follow certain
procedures to accomplish deprivations of life, liberty, or property. See Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37
(1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 96 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970); see generally
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 9, § 13.1-.10 (discussing procedural due process). Although the Court has not explicitly delineated them,
two subcategories of procedural due process exist: a "regularized deprivation"
division (headed by Goldberg) and a "random and unauthorized conduct" divi-
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reason that due process is disproportionately represented in
constitutional tort cases is that two of the forms of due process
rights have not had clearly articulated limits: "shock the conscience" substantive due process and procedural due process
claims to redress "random and unauthorized" personal injury
and property damage by government officials. In a line of cases
decided over the last ten years or so, the Court has struggled to
distinguish between these two forms of due process and to define the boundaries between them and common-law torts, redefining as necessary to limit the types of injuries for which a
remedy is available under the due process clause.
More than ten years ago, these two forms of due process
were not separated from each other as they are today. At that
time, a complainant seeking damages to redress an injury
caused by a government action that did not violate some more
specific constitutional guarantee could bring a suit alleging simply that a government official had caused a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process. The deprivation element of the claim was relatively clear; the "absence of due process" element was less so. Most courts would look to the
Supreme Court's holding in Rochin v. California1 3 and hold
that deprivations caused by official conduct that "shocks the
conscience" violated due process.1 4 Because most cases involved intentional beatings or similar fact patterns,15 one of the
more well-developed due process rights was the right to be free
from unjustified bodily harm.1 6 A similar theory of recovery
sion (headed by Parrattand Hudson). Whether there are really distinct subcategories depends on the resolution of an issue left open in Daniels: whether
a post-deprivation state compensatory remedy is adequate when state sovereign immunity bars all recovery. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. If
the absence of any remedy does not violate due process, then the Parrattdivision is sufficiently different from the Goldberg v. Kelly division to form its
own category. See infra notes 91, 134.
13. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
14. Id. at 172.
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (2d Cir.) (beating by
police), cert denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973); Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir.
1968) (beatings by prison guards); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992, 993 (9th Cir.)
(beating by prison guard), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 868 (1966).
16. Judge Friendly's opinion in Johnson v. Glick, an often-cited attempt to
flesh out the standard for when official violence violates due process, required
that courts consider "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury
inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. The Court still considers John-

520
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developed for deprivations of property.1 7
It was perhaps not surprising, because judicial consciences
typically are nurtured on generous doses of the common law,
that courts increasingly would turn to the common law in an
effort to define what kinds of injuries were unjustified and
therefore constituted deprivations without due process. Consequently, actions for damages based on due process violations
soon began to share elements with such common-law torts as
false imprisonment' and malicious prosecution. 19 To the extent that courts consciously considered the coincidence of constitutional and common-law elements, they considered the
common law relevant to due process claims because the due
process clause "was intended to give Americans at least the
protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed
as Englishmen against the power of the Crown." 20
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that
courts could define due process protections by simple reference
to traditional common-law tort doctrines. In Paul v. Davis,21
the plaintiff claimed that the Louisville police chief falsely labeled him an "active shoplifter" in a circular sent to merchants
and thus had violated both procedural and substantive due process. 22 Declaring that it would not allow the due process clause
son good law. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); see also
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting Johnson on when good
faith immunity would excuse official violence). It is not certain, however,
whether the Court approved Johnson as the substantive due process case it
was when it was decided or as a post-deprivation procedural due process case,
which it might have become after Parratt.See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text; see also Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and
the FourteenthAmendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 991 n.83 (1986) (suggesting
other possible explanations of Johnson decision).
17. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (explaining under what circumstances state agent taking property violates due process); Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (same).
18. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 793 (5th Cir.) (relying on common-law false imprisonment for proposition that even reasonable conduct resulting in false imprisonment will cause a due process violation), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 901 (1969); cf.Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (finding
no duty to investigate detained arrestee's claims of mistaken identity).
19. See Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 213-15 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 84 (1986). The Court had granted certiorari to
decide whether the elements of common-law malicious prosecution satisfy the
requirements for a due process violation, but dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.
20. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977).
21. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
22. Id. at 694-96.
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to become a "font of tort law to be superimposed -upon
23
whatever systems may already be administered by the states,1
the Court held that no liberty or property interest was at stake
and that only state tort law could protect plaintiff's interest in
his reputation. 24 Three years later, in Baker v. McCollan,25 the
Court determined that a plaintiff held in jail for three days because of mistaken identity did not have a claim for violation of
due process, although an action might lie for false imprisonment under state common law. 26 In the Court's words, "false
imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth
27
Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.'
In none of these cases, however, did the Court clarify the circumstances in which actions by a state official that are tortious
under state law would become due process violations.
The Court finally clarified such circumstances in Parrattv.
Taylor 28 and Hudson v. Palmer,2 9 and the answer transformed
many of what previously would have been substantive due process cases into procedural ones.3 0 In Parratt,prison officials in
charge of the mail room and prisoner hobbies accidentally lost
the plaintiff prisoner's twenty-three dollar hobby kit.31 In Hudson, prison officials intentionally confiscated plaintiff's personal property during a "shakedown" of his cell.32 The Court
in both cases held that, although these losses amounted to deprivations of property under the due process clause, the deprivations were compensable civil wrongs under state law and
availability of that remedy sufficed as all the "process" that was
"due." 33 The Court explained that in some circumstances a
post-deprivation hearing could satisfy due process.3 4 In sug23. Id. at 701.
24. Id. at 712. In Daniels, the Court restated its rejection of the idea that
lower courts can rely on the common law in constitutional tort cases, at least

to the extent that the court bases its holding on "the notion that all commonlaw duties owed by government actors were somehow constitutionalized by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335.
25. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
26. Id.
at 146-47.
27. Id.at 146.
28. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

29. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
30. The Court left under substantive due process those cases in which the
deprivations were so outrageous that no amount of process would cure them.
See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8, § 3.9; supra note 9.
31. Parratt,451 U.S. at 529.
32. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520.
33. Id. at 533; Parratt,451 U.S. at 543.
34. Parratt,451 U.S. at 538-41. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-49
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gesting that post-deprivation remedies are sometimes satisfactory, the Court reasoned that prior notice and hearing are
impossible when random and unauthorized governmental ac35
tion, whether intentional or negligent, causes losses of liberty
or property.36 Thus, there is no constitutional violation unless
compensatory remedies are unavailable or
those state-law
7
inadequate
In reaching this result, the Court rejected a suggested alternative approach for restricting due process claims in Parratt.
That suggestion, which had been raised but left undecided in
Procunier v. Navarette38 and Baker v. McCollan,39 was to impose a culpable state of mind requirement that would exclude
all negligent conduct. The Court could read such a requirement either into section 1983 or into the due process clause. In
Parrattthe Court rejected the argument, holding that neither
section 1983 nor the due process clause contained state of mind
requirements.

40

The state of mind solution soon would look more appealing
to the Court as it became clear that states were resisting even
41
Although states could
the modest requirements of Parratt.
court by providin
federal
suit
from
themselves
have insulated
ing adequate damages in their own courts against themselves or
their employees, many states refused to do so. Consequently,
with lower courts debating whether state sovereign immunity
42
violated due process under Parratt and Hudson, the Court
(1976), contains the most recent and complete analysis of when post-deprivation process is sufficient. But see infra note 91 (discussing the apparent inapplicability of Eldridge to random and unauthorized deprivations).
35. Although Parratt and Hudson involved property deprivations, the
ParrattCourt's citation to the earlier case of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977), demonstrates that the same rationale applied to liberty interests. In Ingraham, the plaintiffs contended that corporal punishment in the public
schools violated substantive due process. Id. at 653. The Court held, however,
that it did not violate procedural due process, because excessive punishment
was actionable as a common-law tort in the state courts. Id. at 672.
36. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532-33; Parratt,451 U.S. at 541.
37. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532-33; Parratt.451 U.S. at 541-42.
38. 434 U.S. 555, 562-66 (1978).
39. 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
40. Parratt,451 U.S. at 534-35.
41. Justice Powell warned of this in his concurring opinion in Parratt,451
U.S. at 550-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Compare Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986), Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 106 (6th
Cir. 1985), and Williams v. Morris, 697 F.2d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) with Daniels v. Williams, 748 F.2d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part), aff'd, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), Harper v.
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adopted the state of mind limitation it had rejected in Parratt.
In Daniels v. Williams 43 and Davidson v. Cannon,44 the Court
held that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a
negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury
to life, liberty, or property. '45 In Daniels, the plaintiff prisoner
was injured in a county jail when he tripped on a pillow that a
guard negligently had left on a stairway.4 6 In Davidson, a prisoner was attacked by a fellow inmate after he had been
threatened and had notified prison officials, who ignored the
notice and did nothing to prevent the attack.4 7 The Court
found no violation of due process in either case because the
negligent loss did not constitute a deprivation of liberty or
property. The Court reasoned that the word deprive connotes
more than mere negligence and also noted that due process is
not implicated when there has been no "affirmative abuse of
power. '48 The Court in Davidson emphasized the breadth of its
holding, observing that "the protections of the Due Process
Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not trig49
gered by lack of due care by prison officials."
Scott, 577 F. Supp. 15, 17-18 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 719 (6th Cir.
1986), Groves v. Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772, 775-77 (E.D. Va. 1983), Hight v. Burden,
180 Ga. App. 716, 717-18, 350 S.E.2d 471, 472-73 (1986) and Shields v. Martin,
109 Idaho 132, 140, 706 P.2d 21, 29 (1985). See also M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN,
supra note 8, § 3.8 ("a procedure which is preordained to deny relief regardless
of the strength of the claim on the merits is not meaningful process"); infra
note 136 (criticizing Justice Stevens's views to contrary stated in his concurrence in Daniels). Sovereign immunity was not an issue in Parrattor Hudson
because the states had waived it to the extent necessary for a constitutionally
adequate remedy. See Hudson, 463 U.S. at 534-36; Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-44.
43. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
44. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
45. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis in original); see also Davidson, 474
U.S. at 347 (concluding that "where a government official is merely negligent
in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally
required").
46. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
47. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 345-46.
48. Daniels,474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 548-49 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
49. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348. The Daniels Court used state of mind to
describe the actor's attitude about the effect of his conduct, excluding acts
"causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels, 474
U.S. at 328; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (using actor's state of mind regarding effect to define "intent").
The Court could have had in mind two other definitions of state of mind,
but that is unlikely. The Court spoke of requiring an "affirmative abuse of
power" and referred to a "mere lack of due care" (defined as a "failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person") as insufficient. Daniels, 474
U.S. at 330-32. These comments suggest a possible misfeasance-nonfeasance
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The Court clearly indicated in Daniels that it would consider intentional conduct causing a loss to be a deprivation and
hinted in dictum that something less might suffice. 50 The
Court observed, however, that the facts of Davidson did not
meet this standard, because the prison officials who received a
note explaining the threat, "[flar from abusing governmental
power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.... misnot particularly serious,
takenly believed that the situation was
' '51
and... simply forgot about the note.
test, but the Court did not develop it. Although commentators have criticized
such a distinction as analytically useless, it is not unknown in common-law
tort actions against government actors. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Moreover, the Court used an example in
Davidsonof a nonfeasance due process violation case in which guards stood by
while inmates beat a prisoner. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
The second possible definition of state of mind arises from the Daniels
Court's emphasis that due process cases traditionally have involved "deliberate
decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property," Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (emphasis in original). This reference suggests
that a plaintiff can establish a deprivation by showing that the defendant
merely gave thought to the action before doing it. As Justice Blackmun
pointed out in his dissent in Davidson, however, many deliberate acts are negligent. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 353 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also infra
note 100 (distinguishing deliberate action and deliberate result). In this respect, it is perhaps significant that the Court in Daniels quoted the portion of
Justice Powell's Parrattconcurrence referring to affirmative abuses of power,
see supra note 48, but omitted the portion indicating that "a deliberate decision
not to act to prevent a loss" also can constitute a deprivation, Parratt,451 U.S.
at 548 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334-35 (suggesting that recklessness or gross negligence might be sufficient).
51. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
have rejected the Court's negligence holding. See id. at 349-60 (Blackmun &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Daniels,474 U.S. at 336-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens based his agreement with the result on his view that the state
remedies under Parrattand Hudson were adequate, despite sovereign immunity. See infra note 136. Justice Brennan, who agreed that negligence did not
suffice to constitute a deprivation, dissented from the result in Davidson because he believed that the facts established recklessness or deliberate indifference. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 349.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE STATE OF MIND
REQUIREMENT AS A BOUNDARY BETWEEN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMONLAW TORTS

A.

NEITHER THE WORDING IN NOR THE POLICIES BEHIND THE

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE SUPPORT A STATE OF MIND
REQUIREMENT

The Daniels Court based its holding in part on semantics:
that "the word 'deprive' in the Due Process Clause connote[s]
more than a negligent act."'52 One serious problem with this
conclusion is that the Court creates a meaning for the term deprive that is at odds with its meaning in section 1983, a provision closely related to the due process clause. Section 1983,
which is the primary vehicle used to institute due process
claims against state actors, requires courts to hold liable any
person who, acting under color of state law, subjects another to
the "deprivation" of federal rights.5 3 The Court has held that
"nothing in the language of section 1983 or its legislative history limits the statute to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights. ' 54 Although there are sometimes good reasons
for giving identical words different meanings in different con52. Daniels,474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 548-49 (Powell, J.,
concurring)). The Court in Daniels used the oblique device of quoting and
paraphrasing Justice Powell's conclusions (but not much of his reasoning)
from his Parrattconcurrence, rather than constructing its own argument from
the ground up. This presents a major obstacle both to understanding and criticism, with the result that the Daniels opinion is not only short, but also cryptic and sterile.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
54. Parratt,451 U.S. at 534. The Court in Parrattcontrasted § 1983's
criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which applies only to a person who,
under color of law, "willfully subjects any inhabitant... to the deprivation of
any [constitutional right]." Parratt,451 U.S. at 534 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1982)) (emphasis added by Court). The Court also observed the well-established fact that Congress passed § 1983 in part "to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the [fourteenth amendment
rights of citizens] . . . might be denied by the state agencies." Id. at 534-35
(quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)) (emphasis added); see also
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329-30 (contrasting the state of mind provisions in §§ 1983
and 242); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1979) (discussing requisite
state of mind under § 1983). Congress extensively debated the lack of a state
of mind requirement in § 1983. See Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can ConstitutionalTort Be Saved From
Extinction?, 55 FORDHAzi L. REV. 1, 17 n.87 (1986) (discussing ramifications of
§ 1983 as strict liability statute, including possible use of "risk analysis" to determine liability).
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texts, 55 the Court provides none here. The Congresses that
framed section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment included
many of the same people. The framers believed that section
1983 reenacted or codified the fourteenth amendment. 56 It is
highly unlikely that deprive could mean one thing in the fourteenth amendment and something else in an act passed three
years later to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
57
amendment.
Moreover, if the term deprive means what the Court in
Daniels says it does, then there is no escape from the conclusion that negligent conduct will not trigger any of the due process clause protections. 58 Incorporated and substantive due
process rights-like the procedural due process rights involved
in Daniels and Davidson-derive their applicability to the
states solely from the injunction of the due process clause that
states not "deprive" persons of those rights. Thus, parties contesting state actions that violate rights as diverse as incorporated criminal due process rights, first amendment free speech
rights, and the substantive due process right to an abortion,
must prove intent or recklessness. This makes the Court's re55. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491-92
(1983) (article III "arising under" federal law language is broader than identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
56. Senator Edmunds, the Senate manager of the bill that contained
§ 1983, described it as "so very simple and really reenacting the Constitution."
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1871); see also id. app. at 150-51 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (stating intent that § 1983 conforms to scope of rights
that fourteenth amendment guaranteed); id. app. at 81-86 (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (author of the fourteenth amendment making same point).
57. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (§ 1983 as originally enacted). The original title of the Act reads: "An Act to enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other Purposes." Id.
In Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872), the Court held that
when
[b]oth acts are in pari materia . . . it will be presumed that if the
same word be used in both, and a special meaning were given it in the
first act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation
in the latter act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary
intention.
Id.; see also United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369, 377 (7th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 326 U.S. 690 (1945) (stating that a "rather heavy load
rests on him who would give different meanings to the same word or the same
phrase when used a plurality of times in ... Acts which are in pari materia
with each other").
58. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348, quoted in text at note 49, supra and in
notes 9-12, supra, and accompanying text (discussing four categories of due
process rights).
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assurance in Daniels that state actors may violate other consti59
tutional provisions merely by acting with lack of due care
rather puzzling, unless the reference is to the contracts
clause, 60 the privileges and immunities clause, 61 or the dormant
commerce clause.6 2 One might argue that this criticism gives
undue regard to the incorporation doctrine and the literal language of the due process clause. Neither the Court nor commentators, however, have suggested any basis other than the
due process clause for applying constitutional prohibitions
against the states that by their terms and history are directed
solely at the federal government, or for enforcing "fundamen63
tal rights" against either the states or the federal government.
59. Daniels,474 U.S. at 334.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
61. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court in Daniels charged that allowing recovery for negligence would "trivialize the centuries-old principle of
due process of law." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332. The absence of any such effect
on the just slightly younger principles of the fourth amendment, however, belies this charge. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding
that search conducted pursuant to subsequently invalidated warrant violates
fourth amendment, but application of exclusionary rule is inappropriate if
"the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on
the technical sufficiency of the warrant [is] objectively reasonable"), cited in
Davidson, 474 U.S. at 356 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir.) (holding that judicial approval of warrant will
not insulate officer from damages liability for "constitutional negligence" if,
for instance, "the officer should have known that the facts ... did not constitute probable cause"), aff'd, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986). In affirming Briggs,
the Supreme Court did not use the term negligence, but did rely on the "objective reasonableness" standard of Leon, holding that liability would result when
"the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable." Briggs, 475 U.S. at 344-45; see also
Willocks v. Dodenhoff, 110 F.R.D. 652, 657 (D. Conn.) (citing Danielsand holding that no fourth amendment violation exists "when a police officer is alleged
to have negligently included material false statements in an affidavit accompanying a warrant application"), aff'd mem., 305 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986); cf Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 548 (1977) (holding that state must
intentionally intercept or use attorney-client communications in order for informant's participation in attorney-client meetings to violate sixth amendment
right to counsel).
63. Because the due process clause would not "filter" Bill of Rights restraints operating on federal officials, a side effect of applying Daniels'sdefinition of deprive to due process incorporation is that a lower threshold of state
of mind applies to state officials than to federal officials. Cf. Butz v.
Econumou, 438 U.S. 478, 478 (1978) (stating that courts should not distinguish
between liability requirements in Bivens actions against federal officers and
§ 1983 actions against state officers). Interestingly, when the Court created the
Bivens cause of action, it spoke of the incongruity between the ability of persons who suffered deprivations of constitutional rights at the hands of state officers to recover and the inability of those who were deprived of their rights
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If state of mind has any relevance to deprive, it is, as Justice Stevens states in his Daniels concurrence that
"'[d]eprivation'... identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but
the victim's infringement or loss."64 The framers could have intended deprivation to require only that a government actor
causes the loss of the right or interest referred to in the due
process clause. 65 To the extent that a person's state of mind is
relevant, deprivation is in the mind of the "deprivee," not the
"depriver." 66
Although the Court in Daniels relies on semantic indicators in the word deprive for its state of mind holding, the Court
also found support in what it saw as the primary policy underlying the due process clause: protection from "abuse of
power."' 67 The Court based this conclusion on the "touchstone"
from the arof the due process clause: "to secure the individual
'68
bitrary exercise of the powers of government.
by federal officials to recover. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
64. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. It is easy to read too much into the wording chosen for constitutional
provisions, absent some collateral guarantee that the framers of the provision
meant for certain words or phrases to be terms of art. One determined to go
down the semantic road laid by Daniels could have a field day with the subtle
communication of the framers' intent lurking in the differences in the language and sentence structure in the Bill of Rights. There is the flat prohibitory language of the first amendment ("Congress shall make no law .... "),
the passive prohibitory injunction of the fifth ("No person shall be held to answer....") and eighth

("Excessive bail shall not be required....") amend-

ments, the permissive, passive statement of rights in the second ("[Tihe right
of the people ... shall not be infringed."), fourth ("The right of the people...
shall not be violated .... ), amendments, and seventh ("[T]he right of trial by
jury shall be preserved ...

.") and the permissive, active guarantees of the

sixth ("[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to .... ") amendment.
66. Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion in Daniels, relied once before on a semantic analysis of the Bill of Rights. In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), he maintained that the plaintiff had no standing to
contest the government's action in giving surplus Army real estate to the Assemblies of God, because the wording of the first amendment ("Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion" U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added)) showed that it restricted only the exercise of legislative
power, not executive power. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479. The Court has not
since relied on this reading of the first amendment. If Justice Rehnquist's
reading in Valley Forge is correct, federal executive branch agencies would not
violate the first amendment if they required all their employees to attend
church on Sundays.
67. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring)).
68. Id. at 331 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
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The Court's attempt to equate the terms abuse and arbitrary fails, however, at least as the terms apply to state of
mind. It is true that some arbitrary actions depend "on choice
or discretion" 69 and thus encompass deliberate action, and that
some deliberate action is action that could be described as abusive, because the actor intends to cause injury.70 The term arbitrary,however, means more. At least for the procedural strain
of due process involved in Daniels and Davidson,arbitraryconnotes action that is unfair regardless of the state of mind of the
actor.7 1 The Court completely ignores this sense of the term
when it translates arbitraryinto abuse.7 2 Of course, those substantive due process violations which require that the state actor's behavior "shock the conscience" of the court will more
readily fit into an abuse of power rationale than73do the procedural due process violations involved in Daniels.
The fairness concern of procedural due process is that the
government will cause a loss that is erroneous under substantive law without providing sufficient attendant procedural safeguards for preventing or correcting that error. The
government acts arbitrarily in the procedural due process context when it permits an unacceptably high risk that erroneous
74
governmental action resulting in losses will go unchecked.
69. WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 110 (1986) (defining
arbitrary).
70. In addition, deliberate action often is merely negligent. See Daniels,
474 U.S. at 353 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
49, at 171; see also infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing cases
in which deliberate action constituted negligent conduct). For example, a motorist deliberately may decide, just this once, to run a red light.
71. See Daniels,474 U.S. at 331.
72. See supra note 9, infra note 91 and accompanying text. Daniels and
Davidson, however, were procedural due process cases.
73. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
74. This fairness notion finds support in a long line of procedural due process cases. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-47 (1976); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255, 268
(1970). Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), stated the general proposition in nearly identical language when the Court found that the
Illinois limitations statute violated due process because it created an "unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims [would] be terminated." Id. at 434-35.
The procedural due process theory is nothing more than a paraphrase of the
first and second factors in the three-factor procedural due process calculus set
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, the prevailing test for determining what procedural due process requires. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (considering value of interests at stake and "risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards"). The third Eldridge factor requires that the court
weigh against these factors the government's interest in taking the disputed
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Thus, the "abuse" of power is the unfairness that results from
the failure to provide an opportunity to redress or to prevent
an erroneous but morally neutraluse of power. When the government abuses its power in this way, the state of mind of the
government agent causing the loss is irrelevant. Losses are inevitable and, so long as the government causes the loss, how
the loss comes about is unimportant; what is5 crucial is how the
government reacts to the problem of losses.7
Although all this is absolutely clear from the procedural
due process case law, in Daniels and Davidson the Court
neither cites nor discusses any of the standard procedural due
process cases. 76 The Court even recognizes, at the beginning of
its due process discussion, that "[b]y requiring the government
to follow appropriate procedures. . . " procedural due process

'promotes fairness" and that it is substantive due process that
"serves to prevent governmental power from being 'used for
purposes of oppression.' -77 Although the Court acknowledges
that the cases at hand involve "procedural due process, pure
and simple,"7 8 it never mentions fairness again and instead pins
the "oppression" or "abuse" label on procedural due process.79
action. If the Court is correct that all governmental action-to cause a constitutional deprivation-must "abus[e] governmental power, or [employ] it as an
instrument of oppression," Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348, it is hard to see how the
government's interest ever could have any positive value to weigh against the
other two Eldridge factors.
75. Some commentators ascribe an even broader policy to procedural due
process, one that recognizes the dignity interests of the individual. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 503 (1978) (stating that "the right to

be heard from, and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct from the
right to secure a different outcome" and "express the elementary idea that to
be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done
with one"); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims of Procedural Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS NoMos XVIII 127-28 (1977) (noting the psychological
importance of "the participatory opportunity," regardless of result); see also
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor AdministrativeAdjudicationin Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 28, 46-57 (1976) (presenting a "value-sensitive approach" to the Eldridge due process analysis). One need not go this far, however, to agree that
it is fairness that is the focus of procedural due process.
76. See, e.g., Logan, 455 U.S. at 422; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319; Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 67; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 254.
77. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also
supra note 11 (discussing substantive due process violations that shock the
conscience); infra note 82 (discussing irrelevance of fairness of process to substantive due process violations).
78. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348 (quoting petitioner's brief) (emphasis
added).
79. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31. There is much in the procedural due process cases that explicitly contradicts the assertion that negligent deprivations
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Not only do the policies behind procedural due process belie any state of mind requirement, but the very structure of
procedural due process demonstrates the irrelevance of state of
mind. The current test of procedural due process requires both
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property and a failure to accord
the process that is due.80 As Justice Stevens points out in his
separate opinion in Daniels, the due process clause does not say
that no state shall deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property; it
says only that no state shall do so without due process of law.8 '
It is clear that a deprivation is a neutral act that becomes unconstitutional, that is, "arbitrary" or "abusive" only when not
preceded or followed by the process that is due. If no process is
due, or if the state affords all the process that is due, the deprivation of life, liberty, or property is not a violation of procedural due process even if the depriver causes the loss with the
most malicious and wicked state of mind imaginable.8 2 Conversely, if the state has not provided appropriate process, not
even the most innocent state of mind on the part of the
83
depriver will save it from liability.
are rare in procedural due process. Goldberg v. Kelly speaks of "erroneously
terminated" welfare benefits and emphasizes that "the stakes are simply too
high for the welfare recipient, and the possibilityfor honest erroror irritable
misjudgment too great to allow termination" without prior notice and hearing.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 266 (quoting district court) (emphasis added).
Logan notes that "it is the state system itself that destroys a complainant's
property interest ... whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference-whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence, maliciousness, or otherwise." Logan 455 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added); see also
infra text accompanying notes 92-94 (discussing Goldberg v. Kelly).
80. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
81. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 338-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. It may be a violation of substantive due process, which "bar[s certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Id. at 331.
83. Even if abuse of power requires an intentional state of mind on the
part of the government official and such abuse of power is the "touchstone" of
procedural due process, it is curious that, under the Court's formulation, it
"touches" only the deprivationstage of the due process violation. See Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that intentional deprivation of right combined with negligent failure to follow procedure stated
cause of action under § 1983); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Patton v. Sourbeer, 107 S. Ct. 3276 (1987)
(noting that Daniels state of mind requirement does not apply to process-affording stage of procedural due process). One could imagine a scenario in
which there is an unintentional deprivation, but an intentional denial of procedural protections. Consider the following two situations: (1) a welfare
caseworker intentionally terminates a grant, believing the recipient is no
longer eligible, but neglects to send a notice of hearing rights before the termi-
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State of mind is equally irrelevant whether the process required is pre-loss or post-loss.8 4 In pre-loss process cases, the
deprivation is the last act necessary to complete the due process
violation. It is therefore at least an understandable mistake to
equate deprivation with abuse, because the deprivation is at
least coincidental with the completion of the violatioh. It is a
mistake nonetheless: if the Daniels rationale is applied to
Goldberg v. Kelly,85 in which the state terminated welfare benefits, the benefit termination violated the complainant's due process rights, because it was intentional and therefore abusive.
The proper understanding of Goldberg v. Kelly, of course, is
that the termination violated due process solely because it took
the
place without prior notice and opportunity for a8 hearing;
6
depriver's state of mind had nothing to do with it.
In post-loss process cases such as Daniels, the neutral nature of the deprivation is even clearer. Unlike the pre-loss process cases, the deprivation in a post-loss due process case does
not complete the violation and thus has no due process significance when it occurs. Rather, due process problems arise only
if the state, usually through an actor other than the depriver,
later fails to provide or denies the required procedural protections.8 7 Thus, the depriver's state of mind at the time of the
nation; or (2) the termination is merely accidental and the recipient files a request for a hearing, but the caseworker intentionally throws the request away
and refuses to schedule a hearing. Under Daniels, the first scenario is apparently a due process violation, but the second is not. Yet, it would be difficult
to argue that the first situation is any more an abuse of governmental power
than the second. It makes no sense at all to apply a state of mind requirement
to either stage of the due process test, because state of mind has nothing to do
with procedural fairness, which is what procedural due process really requires.
84. Until Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in all procedural due
process cases in which the Court determined that some process was due, the
Court held or assumed that the state should afford such process before the loss
became final. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
85. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg v. Kelly was a class action suit by welfare recipients who had no notice or opportunity for a hearing before termination of their grants. They sued state welfare officials contending that
terminations under those conditions violated procedural due process. The
Court ordered that the state afford prior notice and hearing and other procedural safeguards before effectuating any termination.
86. Even in a pre-loss hearing situation, it makes little sense to equate
deprivation with abuse unless the plaintiff is suing the depriver, rather than
the person who failed to provide the procedural protection. Even in these situations, however, the depriver often would have no power to hold a hearing,
but might be required to effectuate the deprivation. In such situations, the
deprivations do not sound abusive.
87. The Court has stated that the "state action is not necessarily corn-
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deprivation is irrelevant in terms of abuse of power. Although
the state may exercise power, it does not abuse power until it
fails to give the process due.8 8
The only way to tie the deprivation to abuse of power in a
post-loss process case is to assert that the subsequent failure to
provide a hearing makes the deprivation retroactively abusive.
This definition of abuse, however, has nothing to do with the
plete" until the state fails to afford the process that is due. Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th
Cir. 1975), modified, 545 F.2d 565 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978)); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984) (stating that
unauthorized deprivation of property by prison guard does not violate due process when meaningful post-deprivation remedies are available). Strictly speaking, the due process violation does not begin until the state fails to provide the
process due, unless we are to view all losses that the government causes as inchoate constitutional violations.
88. See supra text at note 82. For a differing view, see Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J.
71, 98-104 (1984). Professor Redish criticizes Parratton the ground that it incorrectly implies that the "loss of the prisoner's property is rendered legitimate and appropriate.., by the provision of proper procedures." Id. at 100.
He notes that the subsequent compensation of such negligent loss does not
matter, because any illegal behavior may subsequently be compensated." Id. at
101. In substantive due process cases, by definition, a deprivation is illegal because no amount of process will make it proper. If it is a lack of process alone,
however, that makes an otherwise legal deprivation illegal, then in a post-loss
process case the deprivation is legitimate and appropriate as a matter of procedural due process until and unless the state affords no process. In Eldridge,
for example, the Court held that the only process due Mr. Eldridge or anyone
else facing a termination of Social Security benefits is a post-termination hearing. 424 U.S. at 349. If this is true, the termination was "legitimate and appropriate" at the time it occurred if the government afforded the appropriate
post-loss process. The only other way in which the deprivation could be illegal
is if the Social Security Act or regulations did not authorize it, but this is irrelevant to procedural due process. Similarly, in the negligent deprivation situation, such as Parratt,the only other way that conduct could be illegal is if it
violated state law. Just as a judge would resolve the legality of Mr. Eldridge's
loss at a post-deprivation administrative hearing in light of the Social Security
laws, so a state court must resolve the legality of the prisoner's loss in Parratt
in a later tort suit. If the opportunity to resolve those questions in those forums is all that procedural due process requires, the loss is legitimate as a matter of procedural due process as long as that opportunity is afforded.
It may be that many of these neutral deprivations will seem abusive, as
when, for example, guards beat up an inmate or confiscate property. The
sense in which these acts are abusive, however, has nothing to do with procedural due process: that question is determined by the presence or absence of
the required process. The only reference point for saying that these deprivations are abusive is the substantive law governing beatings and confiscation of
property; that is, state tort law. In this respect, it is ironic that the Daniels
holding seeks to separate constitutional and common-law torts and yet defines
constitutional torts by reference, not to constitutional theory, but to abuse-a
term that has meaning only by reference to state tort law.
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depriver's state of mind. It is absurd to say that the depriver's
earlier state of mind changes depending on whether a different
individual or entity later provides a hearing to remedy the loss.
For example, it makes no sense to determine the state of mind
of a guard who takes an inmate's property by asking whether
that state's legislature or courts provide a remedy for inmate
property losses. The only state of mind that a court reasonably
could describe as abusive in post-loss process cases is one where
the depriver causes the loss knowing that no post-deprivation
remedy will be available under state law. In this situation, the
depriver's state of mind is abusive, but it requires a prescience
that is unlikely to exist.8 9
The basic premise that "arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government" is the touchstone of due process may be accurate.90 The Court's conclusion, however, that this premise says
anything about state of mind or the proper meaning of the
word deprive is erroneous. 9 1
89. Judges looking at the matter long after the fact often differ sharply
over whether a post-deprivation remedy existed under state law. For example,
the lower courts in Daniels divided on the question of whether, under Virginia
law, state sovereign immunity would be a defense to Daniels' claim in state
court. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329.
90. See supra text accompanying note 68.
91. A possible explanation for Daniels's serious departure from procedural due process is that cases of random and unauthorized deprivation of procedural due process; exemplified by Parratt,Hudson, and Daniels, are in a
catdgory separate from the procedural due process cases exemplified by
Goldberg v. Kelly and Eldridge. Cases from one category rarely cite or rely on
cases from the other. The Eldridge cost-benefit factors, see supra note 74, apparently are not applied to cases like Parrattand Hudson. For example, Parratt and Hudson necessarily mean that it is permissible to impose a
requirement that a claimant initiate the post-loss hearing mechanism. See
Parratt,451 U.S. at 541. If the Court used the balancing test of Eldridge, there
would be no good reason why the government should not offer the injured
party the opportunity for a post-deprivation hearing, as happened in Eldridge,
rather than requiring that the party file suit, or at least provide the injured
party with notice of the right to pursue any state compensatory remedy.
Moreover, if the Court applied the Eldridge factors, the quality of the postdeprivation procedures required would depend on the magnitude of the loss
involved, the other two factors being equal. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
Thus, deprivations of life or liberty presumably would receive more procedural solicitude than minor property losses. This distinction never has been
applied in the Parratt line of cases. The biggest divergence between the
Goldberg v. Kelly-Eldridge and Parratt-Hudsonlines of cases may yet come, if
Justice Stevens is correct in his concurrence in Daniels that the test of the
quality of the process due in the Parrattline of cases is whether the state's
overall system for compensating injuries to persons and property is fair, not
whether claimants receive meaningful hearings on the merits of their claims.
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341-43 (Stevens, J., concurring); see infra note 136.
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PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE STATE OF MIND TEST

Even granting that the due process clause aims exclusively
at abuses of power, it misses its mark when the Court's state of
mind test guides its application. The test is both underinclusive
and overinclusive. As construed in Daniels, procedural due
process fails to protect against many types of actions that intuitively seem to constitute abuses of power and it brings within
its scope a considerable number of actions that do not seem to
be abuses.
1.

Underinclusiveness

Daniels excludes all negligent deprivations, yet negligent
deprivations without due process are even more abusive or oppressive than intentional deprivations without due process.
Consider the basic facts of Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the state
terminated welfare recipients' grants without prior notice or
hearing.92 Assume that the plaintiffs' welfare grants were accidentally or negligently cut off by mistake, rather than being intentionally terminated for failure to satisfy some eligibility
requirement. 93 Under the Daniels test, the Court would not
consider the loss of benefits a deprivation. Thus, there would
be no right to notice, hearing, or any other process either
94
before or after the termination.
92. 397 U.S. 254, 255-57 (1970); see supra note 85.
93. This could occur because the caseworker confused the plaintiffs with
others, or, even more unknowingly, because the worker inputting the terminations into the computer mistyped a digit, or because the computer had a
"storm" in its circuitry when the caseworker was doing something completely
unrelated to the plaintiffs or to their terminations.
94. One might argue that if the termination is negligent, the prior notice
and administrative hearing contemplated by Goldberg v. Kelly are "not only
impracticable, but impossible" and thus not required by due process for that
reason. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 541. This argument misreads Parratt,which
makes clear that the random and unauthorized nature of a loss does not make
it any less a deprivation; it simply modifies the form and timing of the process
that is due. Id. at 540. Even if prior notice and hearing are impossible, postloss administrative process is possible and the Court has required it in similar
circumstances. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349. In the hypothetical above, there
is no deprivation under Daniels, and thus no right to notice or hearing at any
time. Neither Goldberg v. Kelly nor Parrattstands for the proposition that administrative due process must either be pre-loss or none at all. In addition,
Parratt'slimitation on administrative process applies only when the deprivation results from a random and unauthorized act that is "not a result of some
established state procedure," such that "the State cannot predict precisely
when the loss will occur." Parratt,451 U.S. at 541. Pre-loss process is possible
even when the loss is random and unauthorized, so long as the loss takes place
within the context of an established state procedure, because there is generally
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It is perhaps a subtle distinction among bad results to say
that it is worse to lose something for no reason than for a reason that you understand but with which you disagree. 95 When
a caseworker intentionally terminates benefits, at least such action reflects one person's rational view of the facts and the law.
When the termination occurs accidentally, it is by definition
wrong. As a result, the lack of a hearing would seem more oppressive, because the amenability of the termination to correction at a hearing is much greater for the negligent than for the
intentional termination. After all, a welfare recipient facing an
intentional termination may or may not persuade the hearing
officer that the caseworker's considered view of the facts and
the law is erroneous. When the cut-off is accidental, the requirement of a hearing should reverse the termination every
time. 96

Just as an exclusive focus on the depriver's state of mind
ignores the likelihood of error and ease of avoiding that error
by procedural safeguards, such a focus also ignores the magnitude of the loss. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Davidson suggests that the majority's holding in Daniels would remove from
the sweep of the due process clause even negligent action that
causes the execution of the wrong prisoner. 97 The failure accurately to identify the condemned prisoner and the resultant exa lag between the act initiating the deprivation and the date it takes effect. Indeed, federal regulations require suspense periods for benefit termination in
all federal-state welfare programs. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4), (6) (1987)
(concerning termination under various titles of Social Security Act). Consequently, it is possible to provide prior notice and hearing opportunity when the
termination is unintentional because computers can automatically generate
the required notices and stop the negligently caused loss from going into effect
if the affected recipient protests the action during the suspense period.
95. The latter is more consistent with the values underlying procedural
due process. See supra note 75.
96. The Court largely determines what process is due by estimating "the
probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural safeguards" for avoiding erroneous deprivations. Eldridge,424 U.S. at 335; see supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
97. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The negligent
conduct that led to the arrest and continued detention of the plaintiff in Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), was mistaken identification. The Baker Court
found no due process violation. 443 U.S. at 145-46. The Fifth Circuit saw the
issue as whether the defendant sheriff "had negligently failed to establish certain identification procedures which would have revealed that [plaintiff] was
not the man" named in the arrest warrant. Id. at 139. The Supreme Court
skirted the negligence issue and decided against the plaintiff on the ground
that the sheriff's failure to investigate was not a violation of due process. Id.
at 145-46. Daniels would seem to require the same result for mistaken execution as it required for mistaken imprisonment.
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ecution certainly fall within the category of "negligent acts of
an official causing unintended loss of... life."98 A more common problem is a police officer's accidental shooting of an arrestee. 99 If the state negligently executes the wrong prisoner,
or if a police officer mishandles a weapon and creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury to an already subdued arrestee, it is difficult to say that there has been no
abuse. 100
98. Daniels,474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis deleted); cf Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (holding that eighth amendment does
not bar a second execution attempt when first attempt failed due to defective
electric chair).
99. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(citing Daniels and holding that negligent shooting of arrestee does not result
in deprivation).
100. One might argue that the Daniels test would not exclude a negligent
execution, because it involves deliberate action on the part of state officials.
The Daniels test, however, does not evaluate the deliberateness of the action
taken, but rather examines the state of mind of the actor with respect to the
effect of the actions. See supra note 49. The test thus excludes from due process constraints all "negligentact[s] ... causing unintended loss of or injury to
life, liberty or property." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (first emphasis by the Court;
second emphasis added). Indeed, the guard in Danielsdeliberately could have
left the pillows on the stairway. Perhaps the guard was airing the pillows, ran
out of places to spread them out, considered carefully what to do with the remainder of them, and decided to place them on the stairway. The defendant in
Davidson, deciding to do nothing in response to Davidson's note because he
"mistakenly believed that the situation was not particularly serious," David"son 474 U.S. at 348, certainly acted deliberately. One nonetheless might argue
that the executioner in the mistaken identification hypothetical intended to
cause injury to someone even if someone else actually was executed. A theory
of "transferred intent" similar to the concept used in torts and criminal law,
however, will not work. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.5, at
220-22, § 3.7, at 241-42 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 8, at
37-39. Transferred intent situations involve losses that the actor does not intend and they thus fall outside the Court's stated definition of deprivation.
More importantly, the reason generally given for transferring intent does not
apply to misdirected deprivations. When courts use transferred intent in torts
and criminal law, the intent is transferable because the intent and act are
wrongful as to both the intended victim and the unintended victim. We do not
mind imposing liability for the unintended effects of the defendant's actions,
because the actor's state of mind is properly "evil." See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT,supra, § 3.12, at 283-86; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 8, at 37-39.
The actor's state of mind, however, is not wrongful with respect to the intended victim in "misdirected" deprivations. Execution of the right prisoner
or termination with notice to the right welfare recipient are not abuses of
power. Because the depriver cannot harbor an abusive state of mind bent on
oppression of an intended legal victim, there is no abusive state of mind to be
transferred to the plaintiff. Cf.infra note 208 (discussing transferred intent in
the exercise of power).
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Overinclusiveness
The Court's state of mind test is overinclusive because it

requires a court to find procedural due process violations in
cases to which the due process clause should not extend. This
result occurs because the state of mind test fails to focus on the
identity of and the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant government official.
The paradigmatic intentional act that represents an abusive
or arbitrary exercise of governmental power under the Daniels
test is the case in which a defendant guard intentionally beats a
prisoner.' 0 ' Consider a case, however, in which a guard intentionally beats the guard's supervisor rather than a prisoner. Or
consider the case of a government truck driver who uses a government truck to run over her spouse's lover. Although these
are intentional actions by government employees that cause injury and seem "abusive," it is hard to see them as abuses of governmental power.10 2 If nothing else is required for these
actions to be abusive or arbitrary exercises of the powers of
government, surely the assailants at least must possess governmental power over their victims. Assaults by government employees on persons over whom they have no official power, or
who have power over them, may be reprehensible, but such as0 3
saults cannot constitute abuse of the powers of government
The point is illustrated further by considering cases in
which the government employee's conduct is reckless or grossly
negligent. Daniels left open the possibility that such conduct
could cause a deprivation' 0 4 and many lower courts have so
held. 0 5 Without necessarily disagreeing with the results in
101. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
102. One could argue that a more active state action test than the Court
uses could resolve these hypotheticals. See, e.g., Whitman, Constitutional
Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 33 n.144 (1980) [hereinafter Whitman, Constitutional
Torts]; infra notes 242-59 and accompanying text.
103. The Court emphasized in Daniels that "false imprisonment does not
become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333 (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979)); see also id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976) (noting that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner")). Ironically, the Daniels
Court's exclusive focus on state of mind necessarily means that intentional
torts now will become fourteenth amendment violations merely because the
defendant is a state official.
104. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334-35 & n.3.
105. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); Justice v. Dennis,
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those cases, it seems clear that the due process clause should
not cover some situations in which grossly negligent or reckless
conduct causes injury. Every government employee who causes
an injury while recklessly driving a government vehicle does
not thereby abuse governmental power, because most such employees have no governmental power to abuse.1 0 6 Conversely, if
a police officer interrogates a handcuffed suspect while holding
a cocked pistol to the suspect's head and the gun fires, no one
would doubt that such action is an abuse of power even though
there was only "unintended loss of... life. 10° 7 The distinction
between the reckless use of a weapon by a police officer during
interrogation and reckless driving by state employees is the
same as the difference between a prison guard assaulting a prisoner and the same guard attacking a guard supervisor. To have
an abuse of the powers of government, there must be at least a
governmental power relationship between the parties. A court
does nothing to test for the existence of governmental power of
the depriver over the deprived by focusing exclusively on state
10 8
of mind, regardless of the level of culpability employed.
793 F.2d 573, 578-79 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 380 (1987)(en banc), petition
for cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3626 (Feb. 22, 1988)(No. 87-1422); Coon v. Ledbetter,
780 F.2d 1158, 1163 (5th Cir. 1986); Brown v. District of Columbia, 638 F. Supp.
1479, 1487 (D.D.C. 1986). But see Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1468-69 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 97 (1987). The terminology differs from case to
case and includes gross negligence, callous indifference, wantonness, and
recklessness.
106. Indeed, the Court has noted that such a situation should not result in
a due process violation. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (disapproving any due process test under which "nothing more than an automobile
accident with a state official could allege a constitutional violation under
§ 1983").
107. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
108. The Court has found state of mind requirements in the equal protection clause, under which the Court requires a showing of discriminatory intent
before a plaintiff can prevail. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976). The Court also has found state of mind requirements in the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, violation of which must
disclose deliberate indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
These rights are distinguishable from the due process clause, however. In the
equal protection analysis, the intent-to-discriminate requirement applies only
to suspect classifications-a category of cases in which it is relevant. In virtually all equal protection cases, the government has the right to take the disputed action in the normal course of its activities; for example, legislative
redistricting, firing an employee, denying a license, or terminating public benefits. It is solely the presence of discriminatory intent that distinguishes such
proper action from action prohibited as invidiously discriminatory under the
equal protection clause. Thus, it makes sense that an equal protection violation requires a discriminatory state of mind. In the eighth amendment analy-
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM:
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CONTEXT
Daniels and Davidson define the meaning of the word deprive in the due process clause and thus set the parameters for
all forms of due process claims and for all types of judicial relief for due process violations.10 9 Yet the Court's exclusive concern with requiring "abusive" states of mind is best explained
as an attempt to address a different question: when should
courts award damages for blameworthy behavior? 110 If the
sis, as Justice Blackmun points out in his dissent in Davidson, the words cruel
and unusualpunishment suggest a state of mind requirement not present in
the word deprive, especially when one notes that "'torture[s]' and other
'barbar[ous]' methods of punishment" were the drafters' concerns in adopting
the eighth amendment. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 354 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). Moreover, unless a
specific barbarous type of punishment is at issue, the eighth amendment deals
with prison conditions. It is only a pattern of actions and omissions that imply
a deliberate indifference to a prisoner's plight that will be systematic enough
to amount to a prohibited condition.
109. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348 ("As we held in Daniels,the protections
of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not
triggered by lack of due care by prison officials."); see also supra note 9 (discussing the forms of due process).
110. Blameworthiness in constitutional torts is limited adequately by good
faith immunity. Indeed, the Court could have decided Daniels and Davidson
on the nonconstitutional ground of good faith immunity. Regardless of
whether due process requires that guards pick up pillows, it is reasonable to
hold that the law is not so clearly established, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982), that "a reasonable official would understand" that leaving
pillows on stairs "violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034,
3039 (1987). Although one could say that it is clear that guards should protect
inmates from harm at the hands of other inmates, the Court's casting of the
facts of Davidson as a mistaken belief "that the situation was not particularly
serious," Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348, would seem to disclose a basis for holding
that a good faith belief existed that no duty was involved. The parallel to Anderson is striking. In Anderson, a police officer conducted a warrantless
search of the plaintiff's home in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff was harboring a bank robber. 107 S. Ct. at 3037. One could characterize Anderson as
involving mirror-image mistaken belief that the situation was more serious
than it was. 107 S. Ct. at 3039-40. If it is true that the application of good faith
immunity would resolve the issue, then the holding in Daniels is not only erroneous, it is gratuitous. Of course, good faith immunity does not apply when
plaintiffs sue governmental entities. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 650 (1980). Consequently, anticipated difficulties with Owen in future
cases naming entities may have been a reason that the Davidson Court ignored good faith immunity, thereby allowing it to construe the due process
clause in a way that would limit liability regardless of applicable immunities.
Fear of Owen, however, is irrational in cases such as Daniels and Davidson,
where it would be rare that the random and unauthorized conduct causing the
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Court adopts blameworthiness standards to determine whether
the defendant has violated the Constitution, there will be superfluous doublecounting in damages cases and disastrous results in injunctive and declaratory actions.11 1 There is no way
to limit damages actions through a redefinition of constitutional
rights without having that construction of the Constitution apply to injunctive suits as well. If the Court is to control damages cases without unintended side effects, it should control
them either on a nonconstitutional basis or through use of a
unified constitutional theory that fits all circumstances and
112
contexts in which the constitutional issue will arise.
Some salient features of constitutional tort cases such as
Daniels tend to confound dispassionate constitutional analysis.
Courts must resist these features if they are to avoid the mistakes of Daniels. First, most constitutional tort cases are actions for a personal money judgment against individual
defendant officials. When a court considers the personal liability of officials-often relatively low-level and low-paid officers
injury was required by official regulation, policy, or custom of the governing
entity. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
111. Application of the good faith defense to injunctive and declaratory actions would freeze constitutional law in its current state, because good faith
would allow relief only when the defendant knew or should have known that
his actions would violate clearly settled constitutional doctrine. See Harlow,
457 U.S. at 818.
112. The Court's failure in Daniels to take into account the impact of the
holding on mainstream procedural due process doctrine is not typical of its
usually careful approach to constitutional adjudication. In this respect, the
Court should heed the advice it offered the plaintiff in Daniels, when it quoted
Chief Justice Marshall's famous admonition that "we must never forget, that
it is a constitution we are expounding." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (emphasis in
original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
Constitutional tort cases meet a similar, grudgingly tolerant attitude in the
lower federal courts. See Aldisert, JudicialExpansionof FederalJurisdiction:
A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Case
Load, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 575-76; Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un
Essai, 5 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 567, 567-74 (1971); infra note 120. Academia also
demonstrates a bias. The constitutional tort area is an orphan among academic
areas. Torts teachers and scholars seem rarely to have the interest or background to struggle with the constitutional issues involved and regard the
mainstream torts issues as relatively elementary. At the same time, constitutional teachers and scholars disdain the area as not involving sufficiently rich
issues of constitutional policy and doctrine to be of interest. But see S.
NAHMOD, Section 1983 and the "Background"of Tort Liability, 50 Ind. L.J. 5
(1974); Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, supranote 102, at 5 (examining costs of
using constitutional rights as basis for damage awards); Whitman, Governmental Responsibilityfor Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 225 (1986)
[hereinafter Whitman, Governmental Responsibility] (evaluating problem of
assessing institutional responsibility in constitutional tort cases).
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1 13
with difficult jobs-concerns about fairness are natural.
When higher-level government officials are defendants, additional concerns include the chilling effect of damages awards on
governmental decision making and on the overall attractiveness
of public service. 114 Although the ultimate issue in constitutional tort cases may be whether the defendant officials should
be liable in damages for their action toward the plaintiff, this
question differs from whether the official's action violated the
due process clause. The problem with Daniels is that the case
asks the second question but the Court answers the first
question. 115
A second feature affecting a court's attitude toward constitutional issues in constitutional tort cases is the perception that
the quality and quantity of constitutional tort cases have
"cheapened the currency" of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court clearly is not enamored of constitutional theories for the
11 6
or even
recovery of twenty-three dollar prisoner hobby kits
for more substantial damages from slip-and-fall or automobile
accidents, 117 and complaints about excessive caseloads are well-

113. The defense of good faith immunity in actions against individual state
officers takes these concerns into account. See supra note 110. Despite this,
some members of the Court apparently do not believe that good faith immunity is enough protection. Justice Powell has come closest to concluding that,
even in circumstances in which a court has determined that good faith immunity is inapplicable, "[c]ivil liability should not attach unless there was notice
that a constitutional right was at risk." Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
495 (1986) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978)).
114. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974).
115. Interestingly, the Court in Daniels indicated that its reason for granting review was to provide guidance as to "when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329. This
statement of the issue does not immediately separate the constitutional issue
from the damage liability issue. One commentator has even expressed the
view that "Daniels and Davidson were not written as procedural due process
cases" and has described the holding as only "implicitly" defining when procedural due process protections are due. See Whitman, Governmental Responsibility, supra note 112, at 273. Regardless of what the Court had in mind,
however, the lower federal courts have taken Danielsto heart as the definitive
constitutional decision it really is. See, e.g., Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253,
1261 (6th Cir. 1986); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. Patton v. Sourbeer, 107 S.Ct. 3276 (1987) (applying Daniels to Goldbergv. Kelly-type procedural due process situations).
116. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981).
117. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (slip-and-fall). It
may have been this factor that led Justices Marshall and Brennan, traditionally vigorous opponents of restrictive readings of the Constitution and § 1983,
to vote as they did in Daniels and Davidson. Justice Marshall, although joining Justice Blackmun's dissent in Davidson, 474 U.S. at 349 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), concurred in the result without opinion in Daniels. 474 U.S. at 336

1989]

CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

known.11 Indeed, when some disfavored types of cases make
their way to the Court, the Justices disagree only on the
grounds for reversing them. 119 To many judges and justices,
the application of constitutional provisions to lost hobby kits
120
and slips and falls on pillows seems intuitively wrong.
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concurred in the Davidson Court's
conclusion that merely negligent conduct does not constitute a deprivation of
liberty under the due process clause, although he did express agreement with
Blackmun's dissent as to the application of the rule to the facts of Davidson.
See 474 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Of the justices who have voted consistently for positions that would
limit § 1983 and the due process clause, Justice Powell has been the quickest
to admit that the number of such claims is a large part of the problem. See
Parratt,451 U.S. at 550-51 (Powell, J., concurring). As Professor Whitman has
pointed out, however, "to begin from caseload is to put things backwards."
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 102, at 28. Moreover, Eisenberg
and Schwab's recent study indicates that the statistics are not what they seem.
See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987). They found that the data of the Administrative
Office of United States Courts that is most often cited actually contains no distinct category for constitutional torts. Id. at 668. Of those cases classified as
civil rights actions, half of the nonprisoner filings were title VII cases raising
statutory violations. Moreover, the perception that there is a recent "flood" of
constitutional tort cases is incorrect if one is referring to increases in the relative number of filings; nonprisoner civil rights filings declined from 1975 to
1984 as a percentage of total cases filed in the federal courts. Although the
absolute number of filings in prisoner cases have increased relative to total filings, the federal courts do not spend much time on them. A 1979 study found
that in 1976 the federal courts terminated 68% of the § 1983 actions filed by
prisoners without any response from the defendants, that the federal courts
dismissed most of the remaining cases before the pretrial conference, and that
only 4.2% were tried. See Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of Prisoner
Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 610, 618 (1979).
119. See, e.g., Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-46, 554 (agreeing unanimously to dismiss the case but with varying opinions).
120. With apologies to Justice Stewart, in recognizing a proper use of the
due process clause, it is almost as if we "know it when we see it," see Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), although there would undoubtedly be strong
disagreement on closer cases. I probably owe a double apology to Justice
Stewart, because his concurring opinion in Parrattwas equally intuitive about
the very problem at issue in Daniels. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 544-45 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (objecting that to hold loss of prisoner's hobby kit a deprivation would be "not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and
intent of the Constitution," but offering no doctrinal guidance for the future to
distinguish trivial from nontrivial constitutional cases). Even when constitutional tort cases present intuitively nontrivial claims, they can seem less important than they should to federal judges who lack a special sensitivity to
civil rights cases. Whether federal judges compare them with other tort cases
or other injunctive constitutional cases on their docket, constitutional tort
cases are likely to suffer by the comparison. Other tort cases generally will
involve much more than the required minimum $10,000 in controversy (soon
to be $50,000, see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No.
100-702, § 201(a), 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4642, 4646
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A third complicating feature is that the due process clause
forms the basis for many claims that seem to be personal injury
or property damage claims "masquerading" as civil rights
claims. The very breadth of the due process clause not only invites abuse, it invites comparisons with state tort law in a way
that few other constitutional provisions do. 21 Such comparisons cause federal judges, concerned with swelling dockets, to
wonder whether some of these cases should be in state court.
Separating state law protection from due process protection,
however, is difficult. State tort law generally affords a remedy
for injuries to life, liberty, and property. Although the due process clause does not protect everything that state law protects, 122 state law often creates the rights that form the basis of
23
the liberty and property interests that due process protects.
In the absence of any principle of limitation, therefore, all actions of state officials that have any identifiable consequences
on a person have had the potential to become both actionable
24
violations of the due process clause and state law claims.
The lack of a coherent theory to address which losses of life,
liberty, or property are actionable as constitutional violations
and which losses, if any, a state court should remedy, is at the
center of the problem Daniels and its progeny have unsuccessfully sought to address.
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),(b))) and will entail some interstate aspects, while constitutional tort cases usually will involve a local dispute with
much less at issue. See generally M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8,
§ 14.13 (giving examples of § 1983 awards). Constitutional cases involving declaratory and injunctive relief most often will be class actions, see FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(2), and a federal judge therefore will perceive them as more important and more efficient--characteristics likely to appeal to the federal judge
with a crowded docket. Injunctive actions generally also will be more pressing
cases because, by definition, they present a need for court intervention to prevent irreparable harm. In addition, injunctive cases often will involve novel
constitutional issues. By contrast, constitutional tort cases involve only individual plaintiffs and incidents that happened in the past and the constitutional
issues therein are limited to clearly established constitutional doctrine, see
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), that usually is decided in the
process of formulating jury instructions.
121. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
122. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (holding that reputation interests, even if protected by state tort law, are not protectable liberty or property interests within meaning of due process clause).
123. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-72 (1983) (drawing solely on
state-created rights and expectations to find liberty interest in prison transfer); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-94 (1980) (drawing on both state-created
expectations and federal "stigma" interests in considering transfer of prisoner
to mental hospital).
124. See supra text between notes 12 and 13.
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The potentially endless scope of the due process clause
make it natural for the Court to reach out and do something to
limit it. Undoubtedly, this was a factor in the Court's decision
in Parrattto redefine many previously substantive due process
cases as procedural ones.125 As it became clear that the Parratt
solution was not workable, 126 pressure to find some other limitation undoubtedly played a part in the Court's hasty solution
in Daniels. Because the reach of due process is so vast, however, it is difficult to tinker with one category of due process
doctrine without having unintended side effects on other categories, or even, as in Daniels, unintended effects within the
127
same category.
There are two solutions to the problems that the Daniels
state of mind test presents. The first would be to overrule Daniels and to include all random and unauthorized negligent personal injury and property damage by government officials
within the ambit of the due process clause. It would not seem
to be beyond the ken of due process to require government to
provide a compensatory remedy whenever officials injure citizens even if the injury is negligently caused. The remedial requirements of Parrattand Hudson are not onerous. The Court
has held that the required state procedure need not provide for
punitive damages, jury trial, or attorneys' fees,1 28 and lower
federal courts have approved administrative remedies 29 and judicial remedies that provide only for recovery of the value of
lost property and not for recovery of the property itself.1 30
Moreover, applying Parrattand Hudson to such claims would
create a rational division of labor between the federal and state
courts that would be responsive to the Court's concern for overworked federal courts. 131 Cases involving personal injury or
property damage that does not result from a violation of any
specific substantive constitutional provision or of substantive
due process1 32 would be sent to state court in the first instance,
125. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
128. Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-44.
129. See, e.g., Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1984).
130. See, e.g., Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1985).
131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
132. Although the Court has not specifically ruled on the question, the circuits are unanimous in the opinion that the Parratt-Hudsondoctrine does not
apply to claimed violations of substantive constitutional rights. See M.
SCHVARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8, § 3.9 (Supp. 1988) (showing table of
decisions).
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with federal courts getting involved only if states refused to
provide the litigant with a minimally adequate compensatory
remedy. 133 Although overruling Daniels so soon after the
Court decided it would be somewhat embarrassing, Parrattwas
only five years old when the Court overruled it in Daniels on
the very same due process state of mind question under
34
discussion.
On the other hand, applying even the minimal due process
requirements of Parratt and Hudson to personal injury and
property damage claims could have far-reaching implications.
As the lower court opinions in Daniels indicated, under Parratt
and Hudson a complainant could use the due process clause to
eliminate state sovereign immunity as a defense to state law
claims for damages suffered at the hands of state officials. 135
After all, the state procedures for obtaining compensation
133. The federal court's task in such an event is not onerous because a
court can determine whether state law provides an adequate remedy as a matter of law without the need for an extensive trial. The lower court opinion in
Daniels illuminates how a court handles the issue. See Daniels v. Williams,
748 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Some judges have
suggested that federal courts simply send the plaintiff to pursue state remedies, with the right to return to federal court in the event the state court refuses an adequate remedy. See, e.g., Ausley v. Mitchell, 748 F.2d 224, 227 (4th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Winter, Phillips, & Murnaghan, JJ., concurring in part),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
134. If the Court decides to take this route, there would be no need to resuscitate the adequate compensatory remedy aspect of Parrattand Hudson, because it

is still in effect after Daniels to test the adequacy of state

compensatory remedies for intentional or grossly negligent deprivations that
fall short of substantive due process violations. There may be a need to find a
better definition of the "random and unauthorized" distinction. For critical
commentary on this matter, see Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels & Davidson:
Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72
IOWA L. REV. 101, 132-58 (1986) (suggesting that distinction produces tremendous confusion); Monaghan, supra note 16, at 994 (calling the line "unstable");
see also M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8, § 3.8 (Supp. 1988) (discussing cases that address "random and unauthorized" distinction). There is also a
need to bring the different forms of procedural due process closer together by
applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors to the question of when a post-deprivation remedy would satisfy due process and to the precise requirements for
such a remedy. See supra note 91; see also Bandes, supra, at 134 (stating that
"Parrattis not an application of, but an exception to, the Mathews balancing
test").
135. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. This is distinct from the
less controversial idea that state sovereign immunity would fly in the face of
federal claims in state court. See Employees v. Department of Public Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in
Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 239
(1981).
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would not be adequate if the state allowed no hearing on the
merits of the claim and no recovery.13 6 In light of this possibility, it is not surprising that Justice Rehnquist's tack in Daniels
137
was to beat a hasty retreat from Parratt.
136. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 8; Smolla, The Displacement of FederalDue Process Claims By State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor
and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 831, 871-81;
cases cited supra note 42. But see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 342-43 (Stevens, J., concurring); Whitman, Governmental Responsibility, supra note 112, at 274-75. In
Justice Stevens's view, the bar of sovereign immunity would not render state
remedies inadequate even though all chance of recovery is foreclosed. The
standard that he would impose would be whether invocation of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity renders a state's "remedialsystem... constitutionally inadequate," meaning "fundamentally unfair," rather than whether the claimant
would have a fair chance of recovering in the particular case. 474 U.S. at 343
(emphasis added). In Daniels, Justice Stevens reasoned that state tort systems
defeat recovery for many reasons, including contributory negligence and statutes of limitations, and that sovereign immunity is no different. Id. The problem with this approach is that it applies an aggregate, system-wide fairness
test to a question that courts should judge, and always have judged in the past,
as a matter of individual fairness. For example, suppose a state with a predeprivation hearing system, as required by Goldberg v. Kelly, were to pass a
law depriving its hearing officers of the power to decide the legality of welfare
terminations on the ground of sovereign immunity. Would this violate due
process or would it be, in Justice Stevens's words, a state's "mere... elect[ion]
to provide [itself] with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases [that]
does not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate?" Id. at 342. The chances are extremely low that any one due process lawsuit ever will include so many types of claims that denial of the
protections sought in that suit would infect the fairness of the state's entire
remedial system. Under an aggregate test, a state can deny the right to hearings so long as the categories of cases affected are small and the state does not
prune procedural protections from too many areas at once. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982) (noting that state statute of limitations would violate due process if it created unacceptable risk that too many
meritorious claims of a particular type would be barred). There may be
problems in deciding where to draw the line among various limited defenses to
compensation claims, such as contributory negligence, statutes of limitations,
good faith immunity, and punitive damage immunity. Due process does not require that the plaintiff invariably win in the state forum or win all that he
would otherwise get under § 1983. Perhaps a nondiscrimination rule could be
applied under which defenses at a post-loss hearing would not violate due process if the defense would apply to analogous claims against private tortfeasors.
Cf. Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2310 (1988) (holding that state notice of
claim statute requiring administrative notice to defendant municipality as a
prerequisite to filing in state court cannot be applied to § 1983 action filed in
state court, reasoning that no similar requirement applies when nongovernmental defendant is sued). In whatever manner close cases might be decided,
the complete denial of any opportunity to obtain compensation against a government actor under any circumstance that sovereign immunity entails would
not seem to be a difficult case to call.
137. An additional indicator that the Court is unlikely to overrule Daniels
is Justice Brennan's agreement with Daniels's negligence holding. See 474
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The second possible solution to the problems that the
Court's state of mind test presents is to draw a line between
constitutional and ordinary state-law torts, but to draw it in a
way that makes more sense. The next section addresses this
alternative.
IV.

UNDERSTANDING THE SOLUTION: DEVELOPING
A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF DUTY

Daniels and other decisions seeking to limit the reach of
due process share the notion that there is something wrong
with invoking the due process clause in claims involving certain
kinds of injuries, such as lost hobby kits and slip-and-fall incidents. In essence, this notion embodies the ideas that the due
process clause protects against only a limited field of risks and
that many of the personal injuries and property losses that
have arisen in the cases are outside the scope of those risks.
The idea of a limited scope of risks is familiar in tort law and is
embodied in the concept of duty.
A. THE ROLE OF DUTY IN TORT LAW
The concept of duty in torts deals with the "problem of the
relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal
obligation for the benefit of the other"-an obligation "to con138
form to a particular standard of conduct toward another."
Unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to conform to
an identified standard of conduct, the defendant's actions cannot result in liability.1 39 Stated another way, the defendant is
liable only if the risk of injury to the plaintiff is within the
scope of some duty that the defendant owes to the plaintiff.
Duty is a formidable limitation on the liability of a defendant
for conduct that concededly has caused harm to the plaintiff.
The tort law duty that is most relevant to defining the
scope of constitutional tort duty is the duty arising from statutes. Under this familiar tort law rule, conduct in violation of a
U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra note 51. Cf.supra note 117 and accompanying text.
138. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 53, at 356. This definition of
duty is not limited to negligence or to torts. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
139. As one commentator has noted, there is no such thing as "negligence
in the air." F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 450 (8th ed. 1908). Lord Esher
observed: "A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the
whole world if he owes no duty to them." Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497
(1893). See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 53, at 356-59.
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regulatory statute is wrongful per se. 140 The statutory duty has
limitations, however, and when the legislature has only a limited purpose in enacting a statutory standard of conduct, violation of the statute will constitute a basis for civil liability in a
particular case only if the statute was intended to protect
against the precise harm suffered in that case. 14 1 Thus, it is
only if the scope of the risks that the statute protects against
that the duty embodied
includes injuries like the complainant's
142
in the statute extends to that injury.
The classic case illustrating this principle is the English
case of Gorris v. Scott.143 In Gorris, an act of Parliament required ship owners transporting animals on ships destined for
England to confine the animals in separate pens. 14 Because
the defendant failed to place the plaintiff's sheep in such pens,
the sheep washed overboard. 145 The plaintiff argued that the
court should impose liability because the conduct was in violation of the statutory command. 46 The court held that the statute was irrelevant because the purpose of the requirement was
to prevent disease among the animals, rather than to secure
them from washing overboard. 147 The risk of loss from the
sheep washing overboard was not within the scope of the risks
that the legislature intended to address. Consequently, because
the duty embodied in the statute did not extend to this plain140. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 36, at 229-31. Courts deem the
conduct to be either wrongful per se or presumptively wrongful.
141. Id.§ 36, at 225.
142. By contrast, duty as a limitation on liability for breach of common-law
standards of conduct becomes an issue when questions of liability for unforeseeable consequences and to unforeseeable plaintiffs arise. See, e.g., Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341-43, 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)
(discussing liability in terms of duty); see generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 49, §§ 43, 53 (discussing duty and its scope in tort law); Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUMi. L. REV. 1014, 1023-35 (1928) (discussing various duty tests); Green, Duties, Risks, CausationDoctrines, 41 TEx. L.
REV. 42, 43-47 (1962) (applying concept of duty in selected unforeseen injury
cases). It is in resolving problems of foreseeability with respect to commonlaw liability that duty has been criticized as "a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49,
§ 53. In this respect, duty has had some competition from proximate cause.
See, e.g., Palsgraf,248 N.Y. at 349-53, 162 N.E. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (discussing liability in terms of proximate cause). Fortunately, the problem of limiting the scope of constitutional tort duties does not involve
determining the foreseeability of the injury to the plaintiff.
143. 9 L.R.-Ex. 125 (1874).
144. Id145. Id. at 126.
146. Id at 125-26.
147. 1& at 127-28 (opinion of Kelly, C.B.).
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tiff's loss, the court did not hold defendant liable even though
his conduct in violation of the statute caused the loss. 148

It is important to note that the Gorris court still could have
held the defendant liable for the loss if the defendant's conduct
had violated a common-law duty to take reasonable steps to secure the animals from washing overboard. In other words,
there can be two distinct and separate duties imposing essentially the same standard of conduct. 149 Whether a common-law
duty or a statutory duty is involved when a defendant violates a
standard of conduct depends on the nature of the injury resultwhether that injury is a risk
ing from the conduct and on 150
against which the duty protects.
B.

THE

ROLE OF DUTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

The Constitution assigns rights in individuals and duties on
the government. Duties imposed by the Constitution, similar to
those in ordinary tort law, address the "problem of the relation
between" the government and its citizens and impose on the
government "a legal obligation for the benefit of" those citizens. l sl Whether negative or positive terms define the duties
148. Id. at 129-30 (opinions of Kelly, C.B. & Pigott, B.). Another oftencited case involved a factory law requiring that dangerous machines and elevators have guards stationed near them. In a suit for damages by a nonemployee
injured because of the failure to post such guards, violation of the statute was
not negligence per se because the court held that the duty extended only to
the risk of injury to employees. See Alsaker v. De Graff Lumber Co., 234
Minn. 280, 282-83, 48 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1951); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
49, § 36, at 224.
149. See Gorris, 9 L.R.-Ex. at 130-31 (opinion of Pollock, B.). The court in
Gorris did not consider the common-law theory because the parties did not
raise it. See id. at 131. In the example of the duty to post guards, see supra
note 148, although there was no duty under the statute to the nonemployee,

the failure to station guards near hazardous areas could violate a common-law
duty to keep the premises reasonably safe for all who are legally on the premises. If a statutory duty is applicable, the plaintiff will, of course, prefer that
route to liability over the more general common-law duty route.
150. Just as common-law and statutory duties can overlap, two different
common-law duties can overlap as well. The example of handing a loaded gun
to a child illustrates this. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 43, at 283;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, comments e, f and illustration 3
(1965). If the injury that results is not from the gun discharging but from it
being dropped on a foot, then the injury is probably beyond the scope of the
defendant's duty to use care in the custody and control of loaded firearms, the
principal risk from which is the danger that they will cause injury by discharging. The conduct, however, is also a breach of the duty not to hand heavy objects to children (which would apply equally to bricks and guns), because the
injury that resulted is precisely the danger against which that duty protects.
151. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 53, at 356, quoted in full supra
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and whether they arise in injunctive or damages actions, a
at
court considering a constitutional claim must determine
152
some point the scope of the constitutional duty involved.
The Constitution, like the regulatory statutes just discussed, imposes a more limited set of duties than does the common law. Like statutes, which intervene interstitially against
the backdrop of the common law to limit certain conduct only
in those areas in which the legislature saw some particular
need for regulation, the Constitution addresses limited concerns and limited sets of relationships.1 5 3 The Constitution is
concerned with only one overall relationship: that between the
government and the governed. Even then the Constitution
does not concern itself with all aspects of that relationship. It
does not provide a comprehensive manual for government operations. It deals only with those areas that the framers of the
text at note 138. Several different standards of conduct are included in due
process duties although one could describe each of them as requiring the government to afford due process. See infra note 166.
152. Courts and commentators commonly describe the Constitution as a
"charter of negative liberties" that does not impose any duties to take affirmative action. See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). Although this may be true of the police services at issue in Bowers, it
is not true of the Constitution in general. It may be, however, that most affirmative constitutional duties are enforceable only after the government has
taken some other action. For example, the affirmative duties to obtain a warrant or to provide process arise only when the government seeks to search an
individual or to deprive the individual of liberty or property. Thus, these constitutional duties are not so much affirmative duties as they are conditions on
negative duties. This, however, simply points out the truism that duties are
not enforceable except in situations to which they are applicable. It remains
true that at some point in the government's dealings with a citizen, affirmative
duties that the Constitution compels will arise. There is reason to believe that
constitutional tort cases will involve affirmative constitutional duties more frequently than constitutional cases seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. This
is so because constitutional tort cases invariably deal with awarding damages
based on past, completed conduct. Consequently, they are more likely than injunctive cases to involve situations in which a government actor has satisfied
the factual predicates for affirmative constitutional duties. For example, the
view that procedural due process imposes only negative duties is easier to sustain in an injunctive action in which the court, instead of ordering affirmatively that hearings be provided, simply enjoins the state from taking any
depriving action unless it first provides a hearing. It is harder to say that no
affirmative duty is involved in the corresponding damages action, in which the
deprivation irrevocably has taken place and the court is awarding damages for
the defendant's failure to comply with an affirmative constitutional duty to
provide prior notice and a hearing.
153. Cf H. HART & H. WECHSTER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953) ("Federal law is generally interstitial in nature. It
rarely occupies a legal field completely ... Congress acts... against the background of the total corpus juris of the states .. ").
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Constitution believed were especially important or would be especially problematic. Thus, like the duties that regulatory statutes impose in tort law, constitutional duties protect only
against some of the risks that attend interaction with the government. When a plaintiff uses the due process clause, therefore, a loss must not only involve life, liberty, or property, but
also must be of a type that is within the scope of the5 4 risks
against which it is the purpose of the process to protect.
Common-law duties arise in virtually all relationships and
protect against most risks of loss, with "foreseeability" being
the primary limit on those duties. 15 5 Consequently, just as
there is potential overlap in coverage between common-law and
statutory duties, 1 56 overlap of common-law and constitutional
duties also is possible. Further, because the range of constitutional duties is much less comprehensive, official conduct most
often will violate a common-law duty but not a constitutional
one.
The question presented in Daniels and the cases leading up
to that decision is: when does the government actor's conduct
breach only a common-law duty and when does it breach a constitutional duty? A court can answer this question only by separating the duties and allowing claims under the Constitution
only to the extent that they involve breaches of a constitutionally-secured duty, irrespective of whether the challenged con1 57
duct also might violate some common-law duty.
154. To the extent that contemporary understandings about the liability of
public officers lend some legitimacy to a scope analysis, one should note the
following passage from a treatise published around the time Congress ratified
the fourteenth amendment:
It is a general rule, that wherever an action [against a public officer] is
brought for a breach of duty imposed by statute, the party bringing it
must show that he has an interest in the performance of the duty, and
that the duty was imposed for his benefit. Thus where a statute required a postmaster to publish a list of uncalled for letters in the
newspaper having the largest circulation, a publisher of such a paper
has not, as such, a sufficient interest in the performance of the duty,
to give him a right of action against the postmaster for its non-performance. The object of such a statute is rather to benefit those to
whom letters are, or may be, addressed, than the publishers of
newspapers.
T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 174
(New York 1869).
155. See supra note 142.
156. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
157. Justice Harlan, concurring in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), suggested a similar theory about the relationship between constitutional and common-law torts. He speculated that the Congress that passed § 1983 wanted
courts to allow plaintiffs to recover for actions of state officials that violated
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The Court in Daniels seems to hint that the real problem is
a duty problem, but fails to carry through and solve it. The
Court emphasizes the limited scope of the Constitution's commands, observing that "[o]ur Constitution deals with the large
concerns of the governors and the governed" and not with "injuries that attend living together in society. '15 8 The Court also
states that "[t]he only tie between the facts of this case and
anything governmental in nature is the fact that respondent
was a sheriff's deputy at the Richmond City jail and petitioner
was an inmate confined in that jail,'' 159 carefully pointing out
that "the Due Process Clause . . . speaks to some facets of this
relationship" but not to all.1 60 Thus, the Court seems to suggest the rudiments of a duty analysis. The Court attempts to
distinguish between fields of risks defined by the Constitution
and the common law and holds that the constitutional duties
that attach to the jailer-inmate relationship are limited in their
scope, do not cover every aspect of that relationship, and do not
161
cover the risk of the particular injury the plaintiff suffered.
both state law and the Constitution because Congress thought "that a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious

than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy
even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation
of a constitutional right." Id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring). This doctrinal independence of the common-law and constitutional duties renders any overlap
in remedies between them a matter of the "purest coincidence." Id. at 196 n.5
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, who joined Justice Harlan's concurrence in Monroe v. Pape, hinted at the same theory in his concurrence in Parratt, when he observed that it is "extremely doubtful that the property loss
here .

.

. is the kind of deprivation of property to which the Fourteenth

Amendment is addressed." Parratt,451 U.S. at 544 (Stewart, J., concurring);
see supra note 120.
158. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 333 (emphasis added). The Court suggested that similar
problems existed in relationships in other cases in which the Court found no
constitutional violation. See supra note 103.
161. Of the other cases in which the Court has struggled with the limits of
the due process clause, it has avoided an explicit duty analysis. In Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the term duty was not used and the Court only
stated its conclusion that "a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence," although the common-law tort of false imprisonment may require it.
Id- at 145-46. The Court made no attempt to justify this conclusion in terms of
any limitation on duty embodied in the due process clause. In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court backed into the duty issue by dealing
with the question in terms of causation, holding that the parole board's release
of the killer did not proximately cause the death of the plaintiff's decedent.
Id at 281; see also infra note 255 (discussing Martinez). In a case decided just
as this Article was going to print, the Court engaged in a more explicit duty
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Recast in duty terms, the problem in Daniels is not, as the
Court says, that the defendant's conduct evinced only a "lack of
due care;"' 162 instead, there was "no care due," or at least no
duty of care imposed by the Constitution. Although the defendants in Daniels and Davidson caused the injuries, and
those injuries were within the broad category of liberty and
property, the interests were not within the scope of the risks
against which the due process clause protects and thus were not
deprivations. They may have been within the scope of some
traditional common-law duty, but they were not within the
scope of a constitutional duty.
C.

APPLYING THE LIMITED DUTY CONCEPT

Determining the extent and scope of constitutional duties,
as distinguished from any applicable common-law duties, is difficult. The best way to separate the two types of duty is similar
to the method general tort law employs to distinguish violations of statutory duties: a court must construe the due process
clause and determine what risks of injury the constitutional
provision guards against. 63 Ultimately, to use the words of
analysis. In DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Servs., 108 S. Ct. 998
(1989), the Court held that a child who was not removed from his father's custody by the defendant welfare workers could not sue for violation of due process because there was no "affirmative duty to protect" him based on
knowledge of his predicament. Only if the danger were the result of an act of
the defendants or other government actors would such a duty arise. Id. at
4221. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text.
162. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330, 332.
163. A court need not consult any applicable legislative history in the case
of the due process clause. Whatever the framers intended the due process
clauses of the fifth or fourteenth amendments to mean, they felt that it was so
obvious as not to merit much substantive discussion. It is conceded by all that
the due process clause's origins are found in Chapter 39 of Magna Charta as
interpreted by statutes passed during the reign of Edward III. See Corwin, The
Doctrine of Due Process Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 363, 368
(1911). See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272, 276 (1856). Before the federal Constitution was ratified, many state
constitutions had due process clauses. See id. at 276; 24 HARV. L. REV. at 368.
The Madison Resolution offered in the amendment process leading to the Bill
of Rights contained a due process clause, as did resolutions of the Virginia and
New York Conventions. See IV Doc. HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONG.
10, 16, 20. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was copied
from the fifth amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34
(1865) (Rep. Bingham). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 93-94
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, in no place during the process
leading up to the adoption of the due process clauses of either the fifth or the
fourteenth amendment is there any helpful discussion of its meaning.
Wells and Eaton apply a policy extrapolation from the due process clause

1989]

CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

Daniels, the problem is to determine what "concerns" the due
process clause addresses, which "facets of [the] relationship"
between "the governors and the governed" are ones that due
process will "speak to."'164 In separating the constitutional and
common-law fields of risks, the question is not which risks are
more or less weighty or important. As the Court notes in Daniels, "[ilt is no reflection on either the breadth of the United
States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to
say that they do not address the same concerns. 1 65 Thus, the
types of risks and concomitant
Court should concern itself with
16 6
duties, not with their levels.
to the problem of the boundaries of constitutional torts. Wells & Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1982). Borrowing from Dworkin, they determine that the true focus of due process is
"care" and "concern" from government officials. Id. at 31-41. They apply
those concepts to determine when government omissions would violate due
process duties spun from the "care" and "concern" concepts.
164. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332-33.
165. Id. at 333. Despite this comment, the Court's opening statement of the
issue it would decide, "when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level
of a constitutional tort," is more hierarchical. Id. at 329 (emphasis added); see
also Shapo, supra note 2, at 327 (suggesting that conduct comprising constitutional torts should be more egregious than in the "garden variety state tort
action").
166. Before discussing the kinds of injuries that will activate due process
duties, it is helpful to examine the substantive content of the duties imposed,
or in the words of the Court, to examine what the Constitution says once it
"speaks to" a particular facet of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. See supra text accompanying note 164. The overall answer is that
the Constitution requires that the state afford due process, but this means
something different in each of the four categories of due process. See supra
notes 9-12 and accompanying text. For the substantive strains of due process,
the government may not cause the loss regardless of how fair or extensive the
procedural safeguards may be. These categories of due process cases-which
more appropriately might be labelled "no process" rather than "due process"-require that the government not inflict the loss at all. Procedural due
process is more complicated, because there are two constituent parts to the violation (deprivation and absence of process), because two different government actors may be involved in the violation, and because the duties are
different for random and unauthorized conduct. The overall procedural due
process duty of the government, or of an official performing both the role of
depriver and process afforder, is to refrain from inflicting the loss or to provide appropriate procedural protections, either before or after the loss, depending on the circumstances. When the Court requires pre-loss protections,
the depriver's duty is not to inflict the loss at all if the state has provided no
such protections and the process afforder's duty is to provide those protections
whenever the government proposes to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property. When the state must afford post-loss process, the depriver's duty will
vary, depending on whether the loss is one that the state can anticipate or is a
random or unauthorized action. If the state can anticipate the loss, the duty is
not to cause the loss unless the state will provide procedures for contesting its
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The Court in Daniels emphasized that the "touchstone" of
the due process clause is "to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.

'1 67

This phrase

is a useful one on which to build a theory of duty, assuming
that arbitraryencompasses considerations of fairness as well as
abuse 6 8 and that the remainder of the phrase limits its applicability to arbitrary action that takes place in the context of a
governmental power relationship between the parties. 169 With
these qualifications, the notion emerges that a loss, to be within
the scope of any due process duty and thus to constitute a deprivation must meet two requirements: first, the loss must be
caused by a government official or entity enjoying a position of
governmental power in general over the injured party or persons in the injured party's position, and second, it must take
place in the process of that official or entity exercising or atlegality after the fact. If the loss is random and unauthorized, so that the state
cannot anticipate it, there is no point in imposing a duty to refrain from inflicting the loss; if the state does not afford process, the depriver's constitutional duty is to pay compensation for the loss. The duty on the process
afforder is to provide an adequate post-loss procedure so that the victim can
obtain compensation.
167. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)). The Court also suggested that the interactions between the parties that resulted in losses were not "governmental in nature."
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332-33 (also citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976) and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979)). This suggestion is too
general to be of much assistance. Moreover, it sounds very much like the
widely criticized "governmental" versus "proprietary" distinction employed to
decide whether sovereign immunity applies to government activities, a test
that has proved to be indeterminate. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49,
§ 131, at 1053-54. Although many states use the governmental-proprietary test
in their sovereign immunity law, the Supreme Court has refused to use it to
define federal sovereign immunity, see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 65 (1955), to define state eleventh amendment immunity, see Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500-03 (1921), or to determine the state sovereignty
limits expressed in the tenth amendment, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1985). This does not mean that there are
not certain advantages to using a governmental/proprietary distinction even
with its faults. If the distinction were used to define both the extent of states'
sovereign immunity and the scope of due process violations, a certain symmetry would result. Assuming that a state which barred any remedy on grounds
of sovereign immunity would violate the Parrattduty to provide an adequate
compensatory remedy, see supra note 136 and accompanying text, application
of the governmental-proprietary test to expand a state's sovereign immunity in
state court would result in a mirror-image expansion of its due process exposure in federal court, and application of the test to contract its sovereign immunity in state court would result in a limit on its due process exposure in
federal court.
168. See supra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
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tempting to exercise such power over the injured party. The
first requirement recognizes that unless the defendant official
has the requisite governmental authority over the plaintiff, exercise of that authority is an impossibility. The second requirement assures that the defendant brings that authority to bear
in some way.
To apply this test, it is essential to determine when an interaction between a government and its citizens involves an exercise of governmental power. A person having power over
another has "the ability to wield coercive force" over that person. 170 When governmental authority supplies a basis for this
ability, the power is governmental. The mere fact that the defendant works for the government does not mean that an injury caused by that employee involved an exercise of power.
Many government employees engage in conduct that does not
involve any significant exercise of power over others. 17 ' Other
employees do have the authority to exercise power over others
172
and thus have the potential to engage in "depriving" conduct.
Even if power is involved, it must be governmental power for
there to be any deprivation. This requires a close examination
of interaction between the government action and the injured
party.1 73 Interactions between citizens and government actors
170.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1779 (1986).
171. For example, most aspects of building and maintaining roads, government buildings, and parks, handling payroll, operating computers, providing
medical services, and repairing and driving government vehicles involve no exercise of power over others. To the extent that they do, due process duties
will apply. Condemning property to build roads, reducing an employee's salary, providing involuntary in-patient psychiatric care, and firing a truck driver
are all examples of the exercise of governmental power.
172. Even police officers and welfare caseworkers perform tasks that do
not involve the exercise of power over others. When they perform those tasks,
their conduct is not subject to due process constraints, regardless of what injuries they cause. Furthermore, police officers may claim the protections of the
due process clause if a state actor, in the process of exercising power over
them, causes the loss of their liberty or property.
173. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), provides a phrase that may be
useful. See supra note 1 (discussing Monroe). Although obviously intended as
an expanding rather than a limiting concept and directed to the state-action
issue, the Court in Monroe referred to the kind of conduct of a state official
that would be actionable as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (pointing out differences between fourth
amendment violation and ordinary trespass case); infra note 187 (discussing
Bivens). Monroe's shorthand statement may be too narrow, however, because
it implies that the conduct has to be "possible only because" of the official's
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with power over them seem to fall into two categories: formalized and non-formalized.
1.

Formalized Interactions: Uniquely Governmental Means
and Governmental Benefits

Some interactions between officials and civilians have
"built-in" governmental power dynamics. Losses in these cases
are so uniquely within the province of government that we immediately recognize them as products of the exercise of governmental power. For example, denying a prisoner's good-time
credit, 174 executing an arrest or search warrant, 175 holding prisoners for trial,176 or passing or enforcing a statute criminalizing
abortion 177 are not deprivations that a private person could
cause. Other losses parallel those commonly encountered in
private interactions but take on a different cast when the government causes them. Examples of these actions would include
178
public school expulsion, 79
termination of welfare benefits,
public employment dismissal,1 80 and public housing eviction.','
These losses can be distinguished from their nongovernmental
counterparts that private benefactors, schools, employers, and
landlords cause by the fact that "It]he government as landlord
is still the government. ' 18 2 There are two reasons that these
actions involve exercises of governmental power. First, the
benefits owe their existence solely to the government. Only a
authority. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added). A mixture of governmental and private power enters into every official interaction between a citizen and a state officer. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
174. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 553-55 (1974). Wolff is discussed
in Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333-34, as an example of action clearly within the sweep
of due process protections, but for different reasons than those offered here.
175. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1986).
176. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-116 (1975).
177. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
178. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
179. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76 (1975).
180. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972).
181. See Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 386 U.S. 670, 671 (1967) (per
curiam).
182. Id. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring):
It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing
with, and the actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. "The government as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike
private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of
law. Arbitrary action is not due process."
Id. (citing Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).
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person who possesses the requisite governmental authority to
activate the administrative mechanism set up to terminate eligibility officially can cause such a loss. Although private persons
could steal a benefit check or evict someone from public housing, it is only the government that officially can terminate eligibility and take these benefits away. Second, the loss is caused
in the context of a formalized power relationship. Because the
law formalizes the relationship, action taken within the purview of that relationship is an exercise of governmental
1 s3
power.
2.

Nonformalized Governmental Power Interactions

Identifying governmental power elements is more difficult
in interactions between government officials and civilians that
are more free-form and occur outside a formalized governmental power structure.18 4 Consequently, in an unstructured interaction, it is difficult to determine whether the official caused
the citizen's loss while in the process of exercising governmental power.1 85
183. This does not mean that a government official who uses nonformalized means of causing a deprivation, such as physically wresting a check from
a welfare recipient or evicting someone without process, does not cause a deprivation. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
184. All of the cases in which the Court has struggled with the line between common-law and constitutional torts fall into this category. See supra
notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
185. Parrattestablished a category resembling the one developed here. It
drew a line between "random and unauthorized" deprivations that are "not a
result of some established state procedure" and deprivations of the Goldberg v.
Kelly type. The Court in Parrattheld that pre-loss procedural protections are
out of place in the former category. Parratt,451 U.S. at 541; see supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text. Parratt'scategorization, however, does not consider the possibility that pre-loss protections are not out of place for random
and unauthorized deprivations that are a result of, or at least take place in the
context of, some established state procedure, such as the negligent termination
of welfare benefits previously presented in the modified Goldberg v. Kelly hypothetical. See supra notes 92-94. Perhaps a large part of the problem with
Daniels is that it accepts this definitional error from Parratt. An additional
problem with making the quality of procedural protections turn on whether
the deprivation is the result of an established state procedure is that this
method may be circular. Many random and unauthorized deprivations are
simply actions that no federal court has yet required to be regularized. For
example, courts have held that due process requires welfare administrators to
establish a regularized procedure for the administration of local general assistance programs instead of determining eligibility on an ad hoc basis. See. e.g.,
Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating
that "County may not arbitrarily and capriciously deny" welfare benefits "by
lodging unlimited discretion in the hands of the decision-maker"); Carey v.
Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that denial of welfare benefits
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The rule should be that, if a government actor causes a loss
after focusing official attention on an individual, the actor
causes the loss in the process of exercising governmental
power. Moreover, if the official enjoys a position of authority
over persons in the plaintiff's position, courts should consider
any focus of attention on the plaintiff by that official a focus of
official attention. The reason for these presumptions is found
in the reality of one-on-one confrontations between civilians
18 6
and government officials who have power.
Governmental authority plays a role in any focused interaction in two complementary ways. First, the knowledge that
the official possesses authority over him or her inhibits the
plaintiff's ability to resist the exercise of power. When a police
officer roughs up an ordinary citizen, the citizen knows that resisting an assault by a police officer is different from resisting
anyone else. Because the officer has superior weaponry and
training, resistance is not only futile, but may also be used as
the basis for a charge of resisting arrest. A citizen who manages to escape knows that the officer can mobilize government
resources to find an escapee. Confrontation with a person identified as having the badge of governmental authority therefore
has an undeniably undercutting and weakening effect on anyone facing that official.1 8 7
"without any standards and in an arbitrary and capricious manner" violates
due process); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding
that procedure "vesting virtually unfettered discretion" to deny benefits in
welfare officials violates due process); see also Leading Cases, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 149 (1986) (suggesting that Davidson,

unlike Daniels, involved deprivation that the state could have anticipated and
controlled and for which there was an applicable state procedure).
186. In this respect, of all the aspects of the power test discussed so far, the
focus of official attention requirement comes closest to a state of mind requirement. Unlike Daniels, however, the intent, which has nothing to do with what
is actually in the mind of the official, is intent to exercise governmental power,
not to cause the particular injury. See supra note 49.
187. As the Court observed in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), with respect to federal officials:
An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the
United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.
... [W]e may bar the door against an unwelcome private intruder,
or call the police if he persists in seeking entrance.... A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will not normally be
liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another's
house. But one who demands admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different position. The mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement official will normally render
futile any attempt to resist an unlawful entry or arrest by resort to
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The second way that the badge of authority plays a role in
a focused interaction is by facilitating the conduct of the defendant official. Unlike the first way, this effect is not dependent on the plaintiff's knowledge of the putative depriver's
official position. Rather the effect flows directly from the
existence vel non of the authority and the official's knowledge
of the extent of the authority. That authority may make
uniquely governmental methods of injury available, such as the
option of throwing the victim in jail. It may also greatly facilitate the use of instruments of injury that are less uniquely governmental-guns and clubs-by making them readily available
for immediate use. Perhaps the badge of authority facilitates a
government official's depredations most significantly by means
that are less tangible than supplying instruments. The mere
fact of the officer's authority is emboldening. Official wrongdo-ers do not worry as much as nonofficial wrongdoers about interference, whether it comes from private or official sources. A
curt "Police business, please move along" will send on their
way all but the most unusual civilian bystanders and most police officers would not worry greatly about interference from
fellow officers. Even in the absence of actual use of an official
position to facilitate official depredations, the knowledge that
the badge of authority is there to use should it become necessary has a facilitating effect.l1s
D.

1.

A COMPARATIVE APPLICATION OF DANIELS AND THE
POWER THEORY OF DUTY

Formalized Interactions
The results of applying the Daniels state of mind test to in-

the local police; and a claim of authority to enter is likely to unlock
the door as well.
Id. at 392, 394 (citations omitted). Of course, the inhibitions against resisting
authority may be less a product of rational consideration of the tangible consequences of doing so than of simple social conditioning about how to act in the
presence of authority figures in general. "
188. There may be circumstances in which the official technically does not
possess the appropriate power over the plaintiff, but either the official or the
injured party reasonably assumes that the official does have that authority.
Because the effect on the parties operates equally whether the victim or the
officer believes the officer to have the power, apparent authority should be
sufficient to trigger the due process clause. If nothing else, the officer's actual
assertion of coercive force is an unmistakable statement to the less knowledgeable plaintiff that such authority exists. The ability to produce that effect
comes from the officer's authority, because the official appears to be in a superior position to know the extent of the authority.
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teractions involving formalized relationships are significantly
different than applying the power theory of duty. L8 9 Daniels
holds that when the immediate cause of the loss is the government official's negligent or inadvertent conduct, there is no
deprivation. Under the theory proffered in this Article, such
losses would come within the protection of the due process
clause even if the actor only negligently or inadvertently causes
them, provided that the loss is caused in the process of some
exercise of governmental power. 190 For example, imprisonment or execution of an individual resulting from negligently
mistaken identity would result in a deprivation subject to due
process protection. 9 1 Similarly, in a governmental benefit example, a caseworker who accidentally cuts off a welfare recipient's benefits would cause a deprivation and the due process
clause would entitle the deprived recipient to appropriate pro1 92
cedural safeguards.
2.

Nonformalized Interactions

a.

OrdinaryInteractionsInvolving Injury

Among the free-form, nonformalized interactions between
government officials and civilians, there are two paradigmatic
opposites on which both this Article's power theory of duty and
the Daniels state of mind test agree. On one end of the spectrum is the injury that the intentional shooting of an arrestee
by a police officer causes. 193 On the other end is the injury that
189. The subcategory of formalized interactions was discussed supra notes
174-83 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. Most deprivations in
the course of formalized interactions will be the result of deliberate action.
Deliberateness is not sufficient, however, to bring a deprivation within the
protection of the due process clause under the Daniels test. See supra notes
49, 100. It is difficult to imagine unintended losses resulting from some of the
formalized actions mentioned above, such as the passage of a statute. Still, legislative oversight in the sense of error, is not an unknown phenomenon, as
when the statute sweeps more broadly than intended because the legislature
did not foresee all of its possible applications. Cf. Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 354-55 (1964) (reversing conviction under trespass statute on due process
ground that state court application of statute to persons remaining on premises
after requested to leave broadened statutory coverage beyond fair meaning of
wording).
191. Cf. supra note 97 (discussing Baker v. McCollam, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)).
192. Cf. supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
193. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348 (citing with approval Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)) (giving example of
guards intentionally beating a prisoner as an obvious due process violation);
see also supra note 16 (discussing Johnson v. Glick).
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a citizen sustains in an automobile collision with a negligentlydriven government vehicle. 194 Daniels and the suggested power
exercise test both would agree on the results in these two situations, but would reach the result by different methods. Under
Daniels, the only relevant issue is the actor's state of mind; the
shooting is intentional and the collision is only negligent.
Under the power exercise test, the shooting amounts to a deprivation because it is an injury caused by a government official in
a position of power over the plaintiff in the process of exercising that power. The automobile accident injury is not a deprivation for two reasons. First, if the driver is simply a
government driver with no other authority, no governmental
power relationship exists between the driver and the plaintiff
and thus there is no possibility that an exercise of power is involved. Second, even if the government driver in general enjoys a position of authority over the plaintiff, for example, as a
police officer, the driver did not cause the injuries while in the
process of exercising any governmental power over the plaintiff. Accidents of this type are sudden and anonymous interactions, and this suddenness precludes the possibility that the
government official focused any official attention on the
plaintiff. 195
Changing the state of mind in the shooting hypothetical, a
police officer who accidentally shoots an arrestee while in the
process of apprehension does not cause a deprivation under the
Daniels test. Under the power exercise test, however, if the defendant accidentally shoots the plaintiff in the course of an
arrest, a deprivation results because there is a power relationship between the parties and the injury takes place in the
course of the defendant police officer exercising or attempting
196
to exercise governmental power over the plaintiff.
194. This injury is in the parade of horribles that Justice Rehnquist suggests in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976); see also Parratt,451 U.S. at 544
(concluding that drafters of fourteenth amendment did not intend for it to
play a role under such circumstances).
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The same reasoning would
apply to slip-and-fall incidents on state property, such as that involved in Daniels. Either the parties responsible for the condition leading to the accident
are not in a position of power over the persons injured or, even if a governmental power relationship exists; for example, when the person in charge of
keeping passageways clear is a law enforcement officer, the injury does not occur in the process of a focused exercise of governmental power.
196. Cf. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 581-87 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(holding that negligent act of police officer, whose gun discharged while officer handcuffed plaintiff, did not constitute substantive due process violation).
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Changing the state of mind in the collision hypothetical, if
a government driver, even one possessing no authority to do
more than drive government vehicles, intentionally runs into
someone, there is a deprivation under the Daniels test. Under
the power exercise test, however, the results will depend on
who the government driver is and what the driver is doing at
the time of the collision. If the driver possesses no governmental authority over citizens and intentionally crashes into another vehicle or person, the resulting injury may be a violation
of state tort law or may be a criminal offense, but causes no
deprivation for due process purposes. Because there is no governmental power relationship between the parties, governmental power cannot be a factor in the injury. If the driver is a
police officer who intentionally crashes a squad car into a suspect's car in the process of an arrest, a court should treat the
situation no differently from the use of a more conventional
weapon in the same context. The court should find that a deprivation occurred because an official in a position of governmental authority caused the injury while in the process of
1 97
exercising that authority.
Returning to the original state of mind in the two hypotheticals but varying the power dynamics involved, the results under the power exercise test would change, but the
Daniels test result would remain the same. In the modified
shooting hypothetical, a police officer who intentionally shoots
a superior officer causes a deprivation under Daniels. Under
the power exercise test, however, there would be no deprivation because the police officer has no authority over the superior and therefore could not have committed the shooting while
in the process of exercising authority.1 98 In the modified collision hypothetical, there is no deprivation under Daniels if a police officer, while attempting to make an arrest, negligently
crashes into the car of a suspect. Under the power exercise
test, this would constitute a deprivation. An official power relationship exists between the parties and, although the injury
was unintended, it occurred after the official focused attention
on the plaintiff, and thus occurred in the course of an exercise
197. Cf. Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that substantive due process was violated when police officer "use[d] a police vehicle to
terrorize a civilian").
198. This would not be the case under the power exercise test if, for example, the officer had specific authority over the superior officer, such as a warrant for the superior officer's arrest, and shot the superior in the process of
trying to make that arrest.
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of governmental power.199
In the above discussion of the exercise of governmental
power, we have presumed that any attention that an official in
a superior power position focuses is official attention.20 0 That
presumption applied easily to the hypotheticals above. The
question arises, however, whether this presumption should be
rebuttable. For example, a civilian victim and a police officer
are friends and an altercation arises between them from a
purely personal dispute such as the police officer intentionally
shooting the friend because the friend is having an affair with
the officer's spouse. 20 1 Clearly, the officer focused on the victim and exercised coercive force, but was governmental power
involved? One would have to examine the facts closely to determine whether the badge of governmental authority assisted
the tortfeasor in some way. If the officer can show that the two
protagonists knew each other well; that there was an overriding, coherent, private motive for the shooting; and that the interaction bore no traces of a governmental power relationship,
such a showing might remove it from the scope of any due process duty. Because the mere possession of a badge of authority
has a significant effect on interactions between citizens and officials, 20 2 however, the officer would bear a heavy burden of
persuasion and a court should exclude the shooting from due
process requirements only in extreme cases.20 3 If the officer
and victim are strangers, however, governmental authority
played its presumed role in the interaction. For example, a po199. Whether any of these hypotheticals constitute a violation of due process is a different question, see supra note 166, as is the issue of whether good
faith immunity would preclude damages liability, see supra note 110.
200. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
201. This is an example given by Professor Whitman in a slightly different
context. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 102, at 33 n.144; see
also infra note 254 (discussing issues raised by government actors who cause
harm for personal reasons).
202. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
203. See Basista v. Wier, 225 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Pa. 1964), rev'd in part.
aff'd in part, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). In Basista, the defendant police officer went to the plaintiff's house to talk to him about a complaint lodged by
the officer's sister-in-law. Id at 621. Despite the unusual family ties, the
visit's official focus should be determinative under the power-exercise test, regardless of other factors that might have been involved. The family aspects
could be relevant for other purposes, however, such as for establishing or defeating a good faith immunity defense. The case is not so personal that no governmental power was involved. Often, courts deal with these kinds of
problems as state action questions. See infra notes 242-54 and accompanying
text; see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 8, § 2.08; M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN,
supra note 8, § 5.4.
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lice officer may claim to have beaten a person otherwise unknown to the officer, not to accomplish an arrest, but for such
personal reasons as not liking the person's looks or attitude or
because of the officer's frustrations at home or on the job. The
presence of these sorts of personal reasons does nothing to negate the profound effects that mere possession of the badge of
authority has in any interaction between state officials and civilians. Moreover, a government official who uses official
power to vent personal animosity is probably at the center of
the due process concern for arbitrary exercise of the powers of
20 4
government.
b.

Misdirected Exercises of Power

An exercise of power that causes injury, but which the actor does not direct toward the plaintiff, will have a different result under Daniels than under the power exercise test. The
most common examples are an innocent bystander who is hit
by a police bullet fired at an escaping suspect and an innocent
bystander who is hit by a police car engaged in a high speed
205
chase.
Both of these instances involve unintended injury and,
under the Daniels test, presumably would not constitute a deprivation. 20 6 Under the power exercise test, although a general
power relationship existed, the officer did not focus on the
plaintiff. Indeed, the problem is usually that the officer did
not even realize that the plaintiff was in the vicinity. The officer did, however, cause the injury in the process of exercising
or attempting to exercise governmental power over someone.
In this sense, a government officer is wielding power in a focused way and causing injury in the process, a situation that is
the concern of the due process clause. 20 7 The power exercise
204. Similarly, when the defense to a due process violation action is that
the officers did not exercise governmental power because they acted outside
the scope of their governmental authority, there is clearly a deprivation. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961), discussed in note 1, supra. In
Monroe, the injury occurred after an official focus of attention and there is
every reason to believe that the officer enjoyed the advantages of having the
badge of authority identified earlier in this Article.
205. See, e.g., Parratt,451 U.S. at 551 n.9 (discussing collision in Hamilton
v. Stover, 636 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1980) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 915 (1981)).
206. The instances would not constitute deprivations even if the state actors intended to cause injury to one person, but actually caused it to another.
See supra note 100.
207. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
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test, to the extent that it includes negligent conduct, encompasses unintended injuries so long as they are within the scope
of the risks against which the due process clause protects. It is
reasonable to include similarly unintended injuries that unintended plaintiffs suffer so long as the government actor causes
the injury while in the process of exercising power over
208
someone.
Having a rule of misdirected exercises does not remove the
necessity that the conduct which causes a loss, in order to constitute a deprivation, must be conduct that seeks to exercise
governmental power over someone. Although the actor need
not have focused the exercise of power on the eventual plaintiff, the actor must have focused it on someone. This follows
from the premise that the due process clause is concerned only
with conduct constituting an exercise of power over citizens.
This distinguishes the losses suffered by innocent bystanders
hit by police bullets that were intended for fleeing felons from
the losses that occur when a state national guard ammunition
dump explodes. While the former constitute deprivations, the
latter do not. The power exercise test also distinguishes among
types of explosions: while losses caused by the ammunition
dump explosion would not constitute deprivations, there would
be a deprivation if the police caused the destruction of one
of another home in an
house by detonating a bomb on the roof
209
attempt to flush out criminal suspects.
c. Failure to Act
One question that frequently arises in discussions of consti4

208. A rule to govern misdirected exercise of governmental power might
be somewhat similar to the transferred intent notion in torts and the criminal
law. As noted earlier, transferred intent does not work under the Court's version of deprivation. Intent in the sense that the Court uses the term in Daniels is an intent to be abusive or oppressive toward the victim. It makes no
sense to transfer intent from a context in which it could not be abusive or oppressive to one in which it is. See supra note 100. In the power-exercise context, however, the only thing that must be "transferred" is focus, and focus is
equally significant for purposes of determining whether there is a deprivation
in both the transferor and transferee contexts.
209. Perhaps it goes without saying that a police officer's misdirected exercise of power that injures a fellow officer should not constitute a deprivation
because there is no power relationship between the victim and the assailant.
A case that involves a stray bullet from a shoot-out between officers that hits a
civilian bystander presents a more difficult conceptual problem. The shoot-out
does not involve the power dynamic necessary for a deprivation should the
bullet hit one of the officers, but the activity does cause injury to someone in a
power position inferior to both the participants in the shoot-out.
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tutional torts is whether a failure to act constitutes a violation
of due process. 210 Arbitrary exercise of the powers of government include instances in which governmental power is arbitrarily applied as well as instances in which it is arbitrarily
withheld.211 When an official's affirmative action causes a loss,
the issue is whether that act involved an exercise of power over
the plaintiff. To determine whether a failure to act constitutes
a deprivation, the court must make a similar inquiry.
If it is an action's capitalization on the power disparity between the injured person and the government official that triggers the due process duties, it is logical to expect that the
greater the power disparity, the greater the obligations of the
official. In this area, one can distinguish between "normal"
power disparities and "unusual" or "special" power disparities.
An armed police officer stopping a citizen on the street exemplifies the ultimate governmental power imbalance; losses
caused in that context are at the core of due process. Yet this is
a "normal" disparity in power because the suspect still enjoys
the normal ability to avoid some kinds of harm, such as injury
from tripping over a curb while walking. A civilian in an especially vulnerable position, however, is more likely to face injury
not only from official action, but also from the official's failure
to act. For example, if a police officer deprives an arrestee of
the normal ability to protect against injury by shackling the arrestee in handcuffs and leg irons, there is a "special" power disparity and the officer has a duty not only to refrain from
causing injury by positive action, but also to take affirmative
steps to protect against the additional risks of injury attributable to the arrestee's special vulnerability. In deprivation terms,
U

210. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d
298, 299 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 988 (1989) (discussed supra note 79);
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Currie, Positive
and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 872-80 (1986) (surveying cases that address question of what constitutes due process violation).
211. Classifying failures to act as arbitrary exercises of governmental
power also follows from the impossibility of drawing a coherent line between
misfeasance and nonfeasance in the law. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
49, § 56, at 374-75; supra note 152. For example, in an auto accident case, the
failure to keep a proper lookout can be either a nonfeasance (as stated) or a
misfeasance (driving a car without maintaining a proper lookout). Similarly,
the injuries in Daniels and Davidson could be considered the result of nonfeasance (failing to move the pillows or failing to take protective action based on
the note) or of misfeasance (placing and leaving the pillows on the stairs or
leaving the shift without telling the superior about the note). Even more
broadly, the misfeasance could be framed as running a prison without taking
the steps necessary to protect the plaintiffs from the injuries.
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a greater disparity of power may impose an affirmative obligation on the officer to employ power to prevent or mitigate the
harm that would result from a failure to employ power. If
"normal" disparity of power tells the officer to "do no harm,"
"unusual" disparity may tell him to "do something to help."
It makes no sense to impose affirmative duties unless the
government official realizes that the other person is in an especially vulnerable position and the official is able to do something about it. Consequently, it is only if the official has
focused on the plaintiff's particular circumstances that any affirmative duties will arise. 212 When the plaintiff's unusually
vulnerable position is the product of the officer's own actions or
the actions of other government actors of which the officer has
knowledge, one can assume that the officer has focused on the
plaintiff's vulnerable position. When the especially vulnerable
position is the result of nongovernmental factors, the plaintiff
will have to prove that the officer had focused on the plaintiff's
situation. Once a court finds that the officer focused on the
plaintiff's special vulnerability, the court should find a duty to
act to prevent harm whenever the official has the actual power
213
to do so.
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Davidson takes
an approach analogous to the one suggested here.2 14 He states
that "once the State has taken away an inmate's means of
protecting himself from attack by other inmates a prison official's negligence in providing protection can amount to a deprivation of the inmate's liberty, at least absent extenuating
'215
circumstances.
When the State of New Jersey put Robert Davidson in its prison, it
stripped him of all means of self-protection. It forbade his access to a
weapon.... It forbade his fighting back.... It blocked all avenues of
escape. The State forced Davidson to rely solely on its own agents for
212. This corresponds to the requirement that official attention must have
focused on the injured civilian, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of deprivations resulting from the violation of negative duties. See supra note 186 and
accompanying text.
213. In an interesting parallel, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982), passed in 1871 along
with § 1983, creates a cause of action for injuries caused by a conspiracy to violate civil rights against any person who, "having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done... are about to be committed, and having power
to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses
so to do."
214. This approach appears in Justice Blackmun's discussion distinguishing
the facts of Daniels from those of Davidson. Davidson,474 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
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protection. When threatened with violence by a fellow inmate, Davidson turned to the prison officials for protection, but they ignored his
plea for216help. As a result, Davidson was assaulted by another
inmate.

In contrast, "[w]hen the State incarcerated Daniels, it left intact his own faculties for avoiding a slip and a fall." 217 "Daniels
in jail was as able as he would have been anywhere else to protect himself against a pillow on the stairs. The State did not
prohibit him from looking where he was going or from taking
'218
care to avoid the pillow.
Essentially, Justice Blackmun distinguished between "normal" and "special" power disparities. Daniels presented a "normal" power disparity, creating only a duty to avoid causing
harm in the process of exercising power. Davidson presented a
case of "special" vulnerability to harm, which created a more
extensive duty to exercise power affirmatively to prevent the
219
occurrence of that harm.
216. Id. at 349.
217. Id. at 350.
218. Id. at 355.
219. An often-cited due process case involving special vulnerability to harm
that would qualify under the analysis above is White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1979). In that case, police officers left children in a car by the side of
the road without adult supervision on a cold evening after taking the adult
driver into custody. Id. at 383. The court found that the officers' conduct constituted a deprivation. Id. at 384. Because the proffered analysis requires that
the officer focused on the plaintiff's particular condition, however, many of
the cases alleging failures of police to protect would encounter problems. See,
e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed in note
152, supra. In this respect, the requirement that the government official focus
on the victim's special vulnerability resembles the "special relationship" idea
that some courts have borrowed from tort law, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 49, § 56, at 373-74, and have applied in due process cases when the affirmative duty to act is an issue. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 8, § 3.10 (citing
sources); see also Wells & Eaton, supra note 163, at 8-11 (arguing that courts
should impose duty to act when government contributes to creation of dangerous condition); Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE
L.J. 683, 696-99 (1983) (arguing that courts should impose special duty on public officials as matter of constitutional tort policy). Compare Bowers, 686 F.2d
at 618-19 (finding no duty to protect plaintiff who was random victim of released mental patient) with Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of York,
768 F.2d 503, 509-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding duty to provide protection for
abused child slain by mother's boyfriend because special relationship existed
between victim and authorities). As this Article went to press, the Supreme
Court decided a case that largely disapproves of the special relationship theory, holding that the due process clause imposes no affirmative duty to protect
vulnerable individuals from harm unless they are in state custody. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 108 S. Ct. 988 (1989).
DeShaney rejected the "special relationship" theory as applied to the failure to
remove an abused child from its home. See supra note 79.
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POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO A

DUTY

ANALYSIS

The most obvious objection to the proposed theory of duty
lies in its origin in tort law. The Supreme Court has insisted
that it will not "make the Fourteenth Amendment a font of
tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States. '220 In Daniels, the Court
also cautioned that the Constitution "deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed" and not with "laying
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries."2 2 '
There are two responses to this objection. First, one can
doubt the sincerity and strength of the Court's "font of tort
law" admonition, because the Court regularly violates it, most
recently in Daniels itself.222 The Daniels Court found that the

wording of the due process clause embodies state of mind distinctions that it borrowed wholesale from tort law.2 23 It is inconsistent to find these distinctions in the due process clause
while rejecting as irrelevant longstanding common-law understandings about the scope of the government's responsibility toward its citizens. 224 On the one hand, the Court warns against
borrowing well-developed common-law duties that could well
reflect settled understandings about what conduct the Constitu220. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), quoted in Daniels, 474 U.S. at
332.
221. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
222. The absolute and qualified immunities that the Court has created or
adapted from the common law over the years are also examples of the Court
ignoring the admonition. See Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section
1983: The Limits of the Court's HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 78194 (1987) (pointing out lack of historical support for many immunities).
Although the Court often attributes the immunities to § 1983, rather than to
the Constitution or federal common law, it applies the immunities to actions
against federal officials that involve no applicable statute. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (it is "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under
§ 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal
officials").
223. See supra notes 49, 88; see also Whitman, Governmental Responsibility, supra note 112, at 248-54 (discussing inappropriate application of tort concepts when liability of governmental entities is involved).
224. See Daniels,474 U.S. at 335-36 (rejecting rule of South v. Maryland, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 396, 402-03 (1856), which set forth common-law duties of a jailer
"as stating no more than what this Court thought to be the principles of common law and Maryland law applicable to that case"); Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (rejecting common-law duty to ascertain whether arrestee
is person named in arrest warrant); see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing Court's rejection theory that some common-law tort doctrines are incorporated into the due process clause).
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tion requires of government actors in specific situations.22 5 On
the other hand, the Court rushes in to encrust the due process
clause with tort-like state of mind requirements based on facile
assumptions about the framers' use of the word deprive.226 The
truer statement of the "font of tort law" admonition is that
there is a fourteenth amendment "font of tort law," but it
spews forth only restrictive tort law concepts. The duty concept used in this Article qualifies under this revised version of
the admonition.
Second, the charge that finding duties embodied in the general guarantees of the Constitution involves making the Constitution a "font of tort law" calls for a simple demurrer: the
Constitution is supposed to be a "font" of duties imposed on
government officials. The Court does not hesitate to use the
Constitution as a source to "[lay] down rules of conduct" in injunctive cases.2 27 Because section 1983 enforces the Constitution and "is not itself a source of substantive rights," 228 the
proper scope of section 1983,229 at least in terms of duties, can
only be the scope of the Constitution itself.230

If the Court is

225. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 52-91 and accompanying text, see also Whitman, Governmental Responsibility,supra note 112, at 225-26 (decrying Court's increasing use of "language of tort" to limit protections of Constitution); supra notes
109-12 and accompanying text.
227. Daniels,474 U.S. at 332; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 710-14 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Constitution does not mandate limiting period of punitive isolation of prisoners and therefore limit is beyond
power of federal court to order).
228. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (holding that § 1983
does not protect against anything, but merely provides a remedy).
229. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049, 1050-51 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
230. Certainly no other sources for rights and duties suggest themselves. If
the Court somehow suspects that in constitutional tort cases it is not construing the Constitution, but is doing something illegitimate, it is easy to understand why its decisions in those cases have taken such a winding course and
have shown such little attention to serious constitutional analysis. In this respect, Wells and Eaton have presented a rather puzzling look at the question
of duty in constitutional tort cases. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 163, at 1. In
an otherwise excellent and creative piece dealing with the scope of constitutional torts, the authors find it necessary to justify constitutional tort duties as
a species of "subconstitutional rule" in the manner of "constitutional common
law." Id. at 18; see also Shapo, supra note 2, at 324 (stating constitutional tort
"is not 'constitutional law,' but employs a constitutional test"). Reliance on a
nonconstitutional basis for duties in damages cases, however, is no more necessary than in analogous injunctive cases. In both, duties come directly from the
Constitution and the authorization to apply them comes from Congress's authorization of "an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
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suggesting that distilling a specific rule of duty for a particular
case from a general command of the Constitution is not a legitimate endeavor, then it has called into question the whole na23 1
ture of constitutional case-by-case adjudication.
The key to rejecting objections to a duty analysis because it
is a torts concept is the realization that it is not just a torts concept. Duty concepts already determine important issues about
the limits of constitutional rights. In constitutional adjudication, the most fundamental level at which courts engage in a
duty analysis-albeit unknowingly most of the time-is in determining who has a particular right. This determination is important because standing law requires that plaintiffs assert
their "own rights" 232 and prohibits them from asserting "the
233
legal rights of third parties" except under special conditions.
If a court attempted to explain how far a constitutional right
extended and in the process distinguished between third party
and "first party" standing, it probably would do so in terms of
23 4
duty.
Using a simple example, assume that a prison official
promulgates a regulation that allows revocation of "good time"
credits for disciplinary reasons without prior notice or the opportunity for a hearing.23 5 Subsequently, two people claim that
procedural due process requires prior notice and hearing: a
prisoner who loses the good-time credit and must serve a longer
sentence and a state employee whose job it is to schedule and
handle clerical matters related to such hearings, but who is laid
off because there is no longer a need for hearings as a result of
redress," 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and from the Court's power to imply a right
of action under the Constitution, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
231. The Court also has drawn into question Congress's power to legislate.
Any refusal to "[lay] down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries,"
see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332, flies in the face of Congress's precise assignment
of that task to the federal courts. Section 1983 provides that persons violating
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law" in the federal courts. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) (emphasis added); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (holding that Congress may direct federal courts to
fashion common law for labor disputes).
232. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
233. Id.at 500-01.
234. This is because right and duty are interrelated. If the defendant has
no duty to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has no right as against the defendant. See
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-44 (1913).
235. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1974).
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the new regulation. Although the regulation violates due process and injuries to both persons result, only the prisoner has
standing to sue. Turning to more familiar standing situations,
the Court has said that doctors challenging the constitutionality
of a state's restriction on abortions do not assert their own
rights, but those of their patients. 236 The Court also has held
that homebuilders challenging the constitutionality of an alleged racially exclusionary zoning ordinance can be asserting
only the rights of would-be residents of the area rather than
their own rights.23 7 The explanation for these conclusions that
may come to mind is that the prisoner, the patients, and the
would-be residents are the ones directly affected by the actions
of the defendants, while the hearing clerk, the doctors, and the
builders are only indirectly affected, but this does not answer
the question. Why is it that we trace a line from the defendonly
ant's actions to the hearing clerk, doctors, or builders
238
residents?
would-be
or
patients,
through the prisoner,
A duty analysis supplies the answer and it applies to these
examples in the same way that it applies to the tort cases involving statutory duties and to the due process deprivation
question under discussion. 239 A duty extends to a person and
that person has a corresponding right when that person's injury
236. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-18 (1976).
237. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514-16 (1975) (finding that builders
lacked standing).
238. To the extent that the causation and redressability requirements of
standing law are tests of the directness of the injury, the connection between
the challenged action and the injury in the prisoner-hearing hypothetical is arguably stronger for the clerk than for the prisoner. Although the prisoner
probably would not have to show that he would win if the state held a hearing,
current standing law would seem to require that there be some likelihood that
the prisoner would prevail. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-58 & 757
n.22 (1984) (stating that redressability of "concrete interests" must not be "entirely speculative"); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (stating
that plaintiff's claim that she would receive support payments absent prosecutor's discriminatory refusal to bring nonsupport action was "at best ... speculative"). Although holding a hearing would redress the prisoner's injury of
loss of good-time credits only if she won the hearing, merely holding the hearing redresses the clerk's injury. This Author has argued in a previous article
that the real injury in such a situation is the lack of procedural safeguards, an
injury that is completely redressed simply by requiring that hearings be held.
See Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights are
Violated: Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 77
n.112, & 86-87 (1985); cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1979) (holding, in
equal protection challenge to sexually discriminatory alimony statute, that
there is redressability and hence standing even if challenger has little chance
of changing alimony award).
239. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
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is within the scope of the risks against which the duty and right
protect. The tangible injuries to the hearing clerk, the doctors,
and the builders are losses of income. 240 Unless we are willing
to say that full employment for them is at the core of the constitutional provisions involved, the conclusion that the holder
of the right is someone else is inescapable. The injuries to the
prisoner (serving a longer sentence); the patients (restrictions
on what they may do with their bodies); and the would-be residents (restrictions on where they may live based on race); are
more directly within the mainstream of the risks against which
procedural due process, the right to privacy, and the equal protection clause protect. A court that assumes or holds that a
determined
right belongs to one group or another has implicitly
24 1
the scope of the rights and duties imposed.
240. Additional intangible injuries may be involved as well. See, e.g.,
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (recognizing injury
that defendant's racial steering activities caused to open housing organization's
counselling and referral services); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1977) (finding plaintiff developer's
interest in building in restricted area "stems not from a desire for economic
gain, but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available
in areas where such housing is scarce"); see also Burnham, Aspirationaland
ExistentialInterests of Social Reform Organizations:A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff,20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 187-200 (1985) (arguing that
harm to organizational well-being caused by the defendant's conduct that is
being challenged can be sufficient injury for standing purposes).
241. Determining that the injuries to the hearing clerk, the doctors, and
the builders are not within the scope of the risks against which the constitutional rights protect does not mean that these plaintiffs cannot have standing.
If the challenged conduct causes them injury of any kind, they may qualify
under third party standing rules. See Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUm. L. REv. 277, 278, 301-10 (1984). Thus, a court can view third party
standing as a rule allowing a person whose injury falls outside the scope of the
risks against which a right protects to argue on behalf of absent persons whose
injury falls within that scope. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 3-19, at 134-36 (2d ed. 1988). Moreover, "first party" standing may exist to
challenge the conduct if the injuries to the hearing clerk, doctors, or builders
are found to be within the scope of the risks defined by some other constitutional right. In abortion cases, some courts read the liberty that the due process clause secures broadly to include not only the patient's decision as to
whether to have a child ("family" privacy), but also the privacy interest in the
physician-patient relationship, which would value the interests of the doctor as
well as the patient. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (reserving
decision on whether limitations on abortion rights violated "the doctor's own
'constitutional rights to practice medicine' "). Additionally, plaintiffs have
made the broader substantive due process claim, albeit unsuccessfully, that the
Constitution protects against all unreasonable interference with a person's
right to freely engage in the "common professions of life." See SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see also

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:515

When a court determines that a particular injury does not
constitute a deprivation because the risk of that type of injury
is not among those against which the due process clause protects, that court is similarly setting the boundaries of the due
process right involved. In rights terms, the court effectively is
saying that the due process right alleged does not belong to the
plaintiffs and it does not belong to anyone asserting this type of
injury. Although there may exist some state common-law duty
and the injury may fall within the scope of that duty, that is of
no concern to the federal court in a civil rights case. The duty
analysis proposed here is simply an explicit application of the
logic that courts have used implicitly for years in constitutional
right adjudication. Such an approach should not fail merely because courts use the same analysis in tort law.
There is a less fundamental objection to the duty analysis
that does not disagree with the scope of the risks analysis, but,
rather suggests that courts could engage in the same analysis
under a rubric other than "duty." Proponents of this objection
argue that courts could use an evolving, yet still minor, aspect
of the state action doctrine to resolve some of the issues raised
here. 24 2 The fourteenth amendment mandates that states provide due process; the state action doctrine determines whether
it is the state that is acting. The doctrine is invoked most commonly when the person who is the immediate cause of the injury is a private actor and it questions whether that person's
actions are the actions of the government. 243 The strain of state
action doctrine that courts would have to use in constitutional
tort cases, however, is a converse form, maintaining that a government official's actions might not, in some circumstances, be
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(enumerating various fundamental rights that citizens of the several states enjoy). If these rights exist, they would belong to these plaintiffs and the government would owe them a concomitant duty because the injuries fall within
the scope of the risks protected against by these rights.
242. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 8, § 2.08; M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN,
supra note 8, § 5.4; Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 102, at 33 n.144.
243. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-66 (1978) (holding
that private creditor action under bulk sales provisions of U.C.C. is not state
action); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976) (holding that privatelyowned shopping center's action prohibiting picketing is not state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-59 (1974) (holding that action
of privately-owned, state-regulated utility in terminating utility service is not
state action). But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948) (holding that
private homeowner's enforcement of racially restrictive covenant by judicial
process is state action).
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the actions of the government. 244
The cases that apply the state action doctrine in this way
seem to parallel the duty analysis. For example, in Polk
County v. Dodson,245 the Supreme Court held that a public defender appointed by a state court to represent the plaintiff was
not a state actor when he moved to withdraw as counsel. 246 In
so holding, the Court suggested a functional approach to state
action, finding it significant that the public defender's assignment "entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent
on state authority," because the relationship between the parties was "identical to that existing between any other lawyer
and client." 247 A case with facts more similar to what has been
discussed in this Article is Stengel v. Belcher,248 where the defendant was an off-duty, out-of-uniform police officer who shot
several bar patrons in a barroom brawl, killing some and seriously injuring others. 249 Seeing the issue as one of state action,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. 250 The court observed:

The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform
is not controlling. "It is the nature of the act performed, not the
clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty,
which determines whether the officer has acted under color of
1

law."

25

The Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently
granted, but the opinion of Chief Justice Burger concurring in
that dismissal hints that the Court would have affirmed the
244. The basis for this application is dictum from Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945), which states that "acts of officers in the ambit of their
personal pursuits are plainly beyond the scope of state action," and therefore
fail to meet the color-of-law requirement of the criminal counterpart to § 1983,
18 U.S.C. § 241. See supra note 204. Professor Nahmod calls this application
"the converse of the typical state action question." S. NAHMOD, supra note 8,

§ 2.08, at 88.
245. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
246. Id. at 318.
247. Id. (emphasis added). The Court explicitly reserved decision on
whether the same is true of public defenders acting in their administrative or
investigative capacities. See id. at 325.
248. 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976).
249. Id at 440.
250. Id. at 441.
251. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933,
937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)); see also Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1980)
(holding that off-duty status of police officer is not determinative of state-action question); 1 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs: CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 58 (2d ed. 1980) (citing cases).
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lower court. 252 The Chief Justice pointed out that the defendant officer testified that he had intervened to arrest several of
the plaintiffs pursuant to departmental rules requiring interofficer used
vention under such circumstances. In addition, the
25 3
a gun and mace issued by the police department.
These applications of state action concepts seem to embody
a scope of the risk analysis similar to that employed under a
254
Even if
duty theory and could perhaps reach similar results.
duty
the
as
analysis
state action employed virtually the same
preferable.
is
nonetheless
theory, however, a duty label
252. Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118, 120 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
253. See id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Under these facts, the power
exercise theory proffered above would dictate a finding of deprivation, because
the officer enjoyed a position of power over the plaintiffs and caused the injury while in the process of attempting to exercise that power over them. See
supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
254. There is some indication that the analyses differ. Professor Whitman
suggests, for example, that if a government truck driver intentionally runs
down her husband's mistress for "personal reasons," there is no state action,
but if the defendant is a "policewoman who shot, beat, or jailed her rival,"
there is state action. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 102, at 33
n.144; cf. supra text accompanying note 201 (discussing a similar hypothetical
in duty terms). Whitman observes, consistent with the duty analysis, that the
state action issue is "whether the government involvement has provided the
actor with special authority or power that enables her to hurt others in ways
not available to private citizens," and she implies that no state action is involved in her truck driver hypothetical because "a government truck cannot
do any greater harm than any other truck." Whitman, Constitutional Torts,
supra note 102, at 33 n.144. If the state-action test focuses on the instrument
used in the injury and on the presence of personal reasons for the action, it
departs from the duty analysis. As for the method of injury, one could respond that there should be no different outcome in the two situations because,
as is the case with the truck, the government gun or club "cannot do any
greater harm" than a private gun or club. Under the power-exercise test, the
instrument used to cause harm may say something important about the nature
of the power relationship between the parties, but the means used to cause injury is not decisive; the nature of the power relationship between the parties
is. A government truck driver shooting or beating someone will not constitute
a deprivation, but a police officer's use of a government or private truck to run
down an arrestee will. See supra text at note 197. As for the reasons for taking the action, it should not matter that "personal reasons" are involved if the
power relationship is the same. Thus, the police officer who beats up or uses a
truck to run over an arrestee for the "personal reason" that she did not like
his looks or attitude or that she was simply mad at the world nonetheless violates a due process duty. It is hard to follow the "personal reason" argument
as a state action concept to any point short of accepting Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting position in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 224-46 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). See supra note 3. The "personal reason" argument is essentially an argument that, because state law prohibits using force for personal
reasons, such action cannot constitute state action. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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Any state action test that excludes conduct of government
employees which occurs in the course of fulfilling official duties
is inconsistent with its very name. It strains traditional concepts of agency to say that a government employee whose job is
to drive a government truck and who causes injury while driving that truck engages in purely private action that is not attributable to the government in any way. It is not difficult,
however, to say that the conduct of the employee violated no
due process duty, because the actor did not cause the injury in
the process of exercising governmental power over the plaintiff.
Moreover, state action is purely a causation concept; it purports to define the circumstances under which we can say that
it was the action of the government that caused an injury.255 In
tort law, courts have used both proximate cause and duty to
limit liability for damage that the defendant's conduct
caused. 256 A major criticism of proximate cause is that its use
to delineate the extent of the protection that courts should afford to a plaintiff's interests "has led and can lead only to utter
confusion" because "[t]his is not a question of causation, or even
257
a question of fact, but quite far removed from both."
Although one might employ the same basic analysis in a torts
case using either a duty or proximate cause analysis, duty is
"less likely than 'proximate cause' to be interpreted as if it
25 s
were a policy-free factfinding."
255. For example, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court
collapsed proximate cause into state action in what was, in reality, a duty ruling. The Court held that a state parole board's release of a parolee, who had
killed the plaintiff's decedent, was not responsible for depriving the decedent
of her life. Id at 285. Hinting at state action, the Court observed:
Appellants contend that the decedent's right to life is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But the Fourteenth
Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the "State... of
life.. . without due process of law." Although the decision to release
Thomas[, the killer,] from prison was action by the State, the action of
Thomas five months later cannot be fairly characterized as state
action.
Id. at 284-85.
Only a few sentences later, the Court concluded in proximate cause terms:
"[W]e ... hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this parole
decision, appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers' action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law.
Id. at 285; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 108
S. Ct. 998 (1989) (though state was aware of dangers faced by abused child, "it
played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more
vulnerable;" therefore, it "had no constitutional duty to protect" him).
256. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, § 42, at 274 & n.6.
257. Id § 42, at 273.
258. Id- § 42, at 274. The classic example of competing duty and causation
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The same analysis applies to the comparison between state
action and duty. Although state action is purportedly a "unitary concept" that requires a case-by-case determination of
whether sufficient state contacts exist, one can easily see it as a
fluid concept that is responsive to fundamental policy choices
related to the merits of the underlying claim. 259 The converse
form of state action is likely to be even more fluid, because it
must explain something that is counterintuitive: how a state
officer is not really a state officer. A duty approach, unlike
state action, forces the Court to deal explicitly and directly
with the issue of the nature and extent of the duties imposed
by the due process clause-something it has so far declined to
do.
CONCLUSION
The explosion of constitutional tort suits in the federal
courts has caused the United States Supreme Court to narrow
the circumstances in which courts will allow such actions. Because the due process clause forms the basis for a disproportionate number and a wide variety of those claims, principal
among the Court's devices have been limitations on the substantive scope of that clause. The most recent narrowing of the
due process clause specified that to constitute an actionable
deprivation subject to due process constraints, the conduct of
the defendant government official causing a loss must be more
than negligent. By excluding all negligently caused losses from
the sweep of due process, the Court undoubtedly reached the
analyses in tort law is the duel between Cardozo and Andrews in Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Proximate cause, as applied
in constitutional tort cases, has attracted some fire. Professor Eaton observed
that in the law of constitutional torts, the Court has employed proximate
cause in a manner that disguises its purpose and underlying policy. See Eaton,
Causation in ConstitutionalTorts, 67 IOWA L. REv. 443, 461-82 (1982). Eaton
calls the proximate cause rationale of Martinez "artfully ambiguous," thus allowing the Court to avoid "having to articulate the values underlying the decision." Id. at 482; see also supra note 255 (discussing Martinez).
259. See J. NoWAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 9, § 12.5, at 448-50;
Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment
"StateAction" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221 (arguing that state action
doctrine is used as disguised holding on merits of constitutional claims) and
authorities cited therein. In the constitutional tort context, Professor Antieau
has complained that, "[i]f a court believes social policy should excuse otherwise unlawful conduct by public servants, it should explore immunities and
defenses, rather than finding an absence of 'color of law' from conduct of public servants within the clear scope of their responsibilities." 1 C. ANTIEAU,
supra note 251, § 58, at 108-09.
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desired result of reducing civil rights litigation, but constitutional jurisprudence has suffered significantly in the process.
Neither the wording of, nor the policies behind, the due process
clause sustain the Court's holding. Moreover, the Court's holding is internally inconsistent, because it produces results contrary to the Court's stated rationale of preventing power abuses
by government officials. The holding also has a potentially radical limiting effect on the many important constitutional rights
outside of the context of constitutional tort cases that owe their
existence to the due process clause.
In obtaining its desired result, the Court has ignored the
most direct and logical route to limiting the due process clause:
defining the scope of the duties that the due process clause imposes on government action. Although duty is generally
thought of as a tort principle, duty concepts pervade all aspects
of the law, including constitutional law. A duty theory of due
process rights would allow the Court to develop a consistent
and coherent approach that would work over the entire spectrum of due process rights and for all forms of relief that injured persons can request to remedy violations of their rights.
A duty theory would clearly separate constitutional from common-law tort actions in a manner that would exclude from the
federal courts the types of cases that have most bothered the
Court, while forcing the Court to confront directly the question
of the scope of the due process clause's protections, something
that it has so far failed to do.

